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Apologies are part of daily life and occur in a variety of contexts.  A large body of 
literature on the effects of apologies indicated that apologies have a positive effect – 
those receiving apologies have more positive views of the transgressor (e.g., Bornstein, 
Rung, & Miller, 2002; Goei, Roberty, Meyer, & Carlyle, 1997; Robbennolt, 2003; Sitkin 
& Beis, 1993; Takaku, 2000).  An area of emerging research in the realm of apologies is 
in the area of medical malpractice.  The research presented here sought to expand on the 
field of apologies, specifically by examining the effects of an apology in a medical 
malpractice case.  After reading the facts of a medical malpractice case, participants 
watched a videotaped statement of the defendant, which contained either an apology or 
an excuse.  Other manipulated variables included the familiarity between the plaintiff and 
defendant, how steadily the defendant maintained eye contact during his statement, and 
how quickly the defendant spoke while making his statement.  Analyses revealed 
marginal main effects for statement type, eye contact and speech rate on ratings of 
sincerity.  Main effects emerged for perceptions of the defendant – participants viewed 
him more favorably when he apologized.  Implications and areas of future research are 
then discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction 
 In July 2009 police in Cambridge, Massachusetts arrested Harvard professor 
Henry Louis Gates after a concerned neighbor called in a report about men attempting to 
break into a house.  Arriving at the home, the police approached Gates and his driver and 
asked for identification, to which he replied, “Why, because I’m a black man in 
America?”  Police arrested Gates for disorderly conduct, after which he spent four hours 
in jail.  Even though the city dropped the charges, Gates remains unsatisfied.  What he 
desires, he has said, is an apology from the arresting officer.  “I believe the police officer 
should apologize to me for what he knows he did that was wrong.  If he apologizes 
sincerely, I am willing to forgive him.  If he admits his error, I am willing to educate him 
about the history of racism in America and the issue of racial profiling” (Jan, 2009).  The 
officer refused to apologize. 
 Professor Gates’ response to his arrest and treatment by the police highlights a 
basic human response to an adverse event:  the desire for an apology.  In this case, 
Professor Gates sought an apology for the humiliation of being arrested and, according to 
some, profiled.  Given that it is such a basic component of human interaction, it is 
important to clearly define apology and establish what sets it apart from other forms of 
communication. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the factors that make an apology 
more/less credible and effective, particularly in a legal context.  I will begin with a 
discussion of how conflict arises and how transgressors respond to such conflict.  After 
defining apology and distinguishing it from other forms of accounts, I will discuss why 
offering an account is an important step for the transgressor.  Next I will explore what 
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effects accounts, specifically apologies, have on the transgressor and victim, as well as 
some variables which can affect the impact of accounts and apologies.  Then I will 
discuss skepticism about apologies and the ability to detect whether one is offering a 
genuine apology or not. Finally, I present an experiment that tests the effectiveness of 
different kinds of apology in a legal context. 
CHAPTER 2:  Conflicts and Accounts 
Conflict 
 In Goffman’s (1955) seminal work, he proposed a typology for how a 
transgressor should act when faced with his wrongdoing.  According to Goffman, conflict 
arises when one makes a challenge to another, which can result in a conflict.  In terms of 
transgressions, the wrongdoer has challenged his victim by creating an imbalance in the 
relationship; the transgression has put one of the parties at a disadvantage.  Because this 
imbalance creates discomfort within the relationship (see discussion below), the 
transgressor will often make what Goffman termed an “offering” to the victim.  The 
offering’s purpose is to help restore a balance to the relationship.  The offering may be 
tangible (e.g., I will offer you the price of the car I ruined) or intangible (e.g., I will 
volunteer at your shelter for some period of time).  After the transgressor has made the 
offering, it is up to the victim to accept or reject his offer.  Finally, if the victim accepts 
the offer, the transgressor replies with gratitude.  One of the most important elements of 
Goffman’s typology is the offering.  The type of offering made can have serious 
implications for its acceptance or rejection and, in turn, can have serious implications for 
both the transgressor and the victim. 
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Accounts 
 One response to a challenge is for the transgressor to offer an account for the 
event.  According to Schlenker and Darby (1981, p. 271), “accounts are attempts to 
explain away the undesirable event through excuses and justifications.”  In terms of 
accounts, Schönbach (1990, p. 11-12) suggests a four-phase interaction between an actor 
and an opponent.  According to Schönbach, the first phase involves a failure event, 
wherein the victim holds the transgressor responsible, to some extent, for a norm-
violating action.  (For a discussion of norms, see discussion below.)  The failure event 
can, according to Schönbach, be either an act of omission or an act of commission.  After 
the failure event, the second phase is the reproach phase in which the victim reacts to the 
failure event.  Here the victim responds in a way he deems appropriate; responses can 
range from slight aggravation to a search for why the event occurred to even sympathy or 
compassion for the transgressor.  Next comes the account phase, in which the 
transgressor responds to the victim’s reproach, eventually offering an account, admission 
of guilt, or denial.  Finally, in the evaluation phase, the victim evaluates the situation, 
considering the account offered, the account’s appropriateness as it relates to the failure 
event, and the transgressor’s personality as it relates to both the account and the failure 
event.  Accounts, then, are tactics whereby a transgressor acknowledges some wrong, but 
fails to take full responsibility for his part in the infraction.  (One exception to this is 
denial, which is included as an account but is clearly distinguished from excuse and 
justification.  Another exception, within the scope of this paper, is apology.  See the 
section below for a more thorough explanation.) 
4 
 
 As Sugimoto (1997, p. 361) has suggested, when making an account a 
transgressor is “more likely to explicitly state that [he] had no control over the situation 
and attribute the offense to forgetfulness.”  The purpose of accounts is to resolve the 
conflict associated with the actor’s behavior, which has harmed another (Itoi, Ohbuchi, & 
Fukuno, 1996) and, based on the type of account given, the account can help the victim 
understand the harm-doer’s state of mind (Miller, 2001; Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986).  
Researchers refer to excuse, justification, and denial as the most common types of 
accounts.  (Some researchers, e.g., Itoi et al., 1996, include apology as a type of account, 
while other researchers distinguish it from an account, e.g., Scher & Darley, 1997.)  
Because apologies indicate acceptance of responsibility for an action (see discussion 
below), it is perhaps best to identify them as a distinct subset of accounts.  Although 
apologies share properties with excuses and justifications (e.g., acknowledgement of a 
transgression), they also include acceptance of responsibility, something lacking in 
justifications and excuses.  Therefore, using the umbrella term “accounts” does little to 
inform a reader about the transgressor’s acceptance of responsibility.  However, as 
mentioned, some researchers include apology as a form of account.  Itoi et al. (1996, p. 
914) offered three factors that can help distinguish accounts:  the causal association 
between the transgressor’s actions and the harmful event; outcome harmfulness; and 
personal responsibility. These are elaborated in the different kinds of accounts, discussed 
next. 
 Excuses 
 An excuse, one might say, is a partial apology, an apology that does not accept 
total responsibility for the transgression.  “Excuses are explanations for actions that 
5 
 
lessen the negative implications of an actor’s performance, thereby maintaining a positive 
image for oneself and others” (Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983, p. 4).  For example, a 
transgressor who makes an excuse would admit the link between her action and the 
outcome, but would minimize her role in the outcome, blaming the outcome on a cause 
beyond her control (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1998; Itoi et al., 1996; Schönbach, 1990).  
Researchers often view excuses as being the most closely related account to an apology.  
In essence, the transgressor is saying, “Yes, I did this act and this act caused X outcome, 
but circumstances beyond my control made me act in this way.”  People offering excuses 
note dual motivations for their account-making:  they wish to avoid punishment, but they 
also wish to alleviate anger (Itoi et al., 1996). 
 Justifications 
 As with an excuse, with a justification “the harm-doer recognizes personal 
association, but either attempts to minimize the perceived harmfulness of the event or 
rejects responsibility by attempting to justify his or her act” (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1998, p. 
167; Itoi et al., 1996; Schönbach, 1990).  Here, a transgressor admits her action but 
claims that her reason for behaving in such a way has a valid/just foundation.  
Justifications are more removed from apologies because, although a transgressor might 
admit association with some wrongdoing and accepts responsibility for the action and its 
outcomes, she does not accept blame for the action or its outcomes because she believes 
her actions are justified.  The main motive for people to use justifications is avoiding 
punishment (Itoi et al., 1996).  Therefore, unlike excuses, justifications become more 
self-focused.  Perhaps the most clear conceptualization of the distinction of excuses and 
justifications comes from Semin and Manstead (1983, p. 80):  “Excuses deny some or 
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any measure of responsibility for what is admittedly an offensive act.  Justifications deny 
some or any measure of offensiveness in an act for which the individual admits 
responsibility.” 
 Denials 
 Finally, denial involves the transgressor rejecting all association with the harmful 
event (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1998; Itoi et al., 1996; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).  
A denial is issued when the transgressor admits no association with the event and accepts 
no responsibility for the event or its outcomes.  Although denial might have negative 
consequences (Itoi and colleagues, 1996, for example, noted that a denial indicates no 
intention of actually resolving a social conflict, as the actor refuses to acknowledge a 
violation or any responsibility for harmful consequences), Kim and colleagues (2004) 
suggested that denial can be a beneficial account strategy in some circumstances.  
Specifically, Kim et al. argued that when there has been a trust violation, denial might be 
in the violator’s best interest, as it could force individuals to give him the benefit of the 
doubt.  Also, in terms of certain types of relational violations, denial actually acts as the 
optimal response -- for example, when one had committed an “integrity-based violation” 
(e.g., intentionally misfiling paperwork to “understate a client’s taxable income,” Ferrin, 
Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007, p. 897, Experiment 1).  According to the authors, denial is 
an optimal response when a violation is integrity-based because perceivers initially 
believe allegations of violations.  A denial, however, can lead the perceiver to “unaccept” 
his belief in the denier’s guilt.  Also, the desire to avoid punishment is a primary force 
behind denial (Itoi et al., 1996), as it is similarly a major motivation for justification. 
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Confessions 
 I will offer one further type of account:  confession.  According to Weiner, 
Graham, Peter, and Zmuidinas (1991), a confession “assumes both the acceptance of 
responsibility and personal blame” (p. 283).  In this instance, confession is distinct from 
the other accounts because it involves one accepting blame and taking responsibility, but, 
following Weiner and colleagues’ definition, it does not include any attempt at explaining 
one’s behavior.  Instead, one simply admits fault, but does not necessarily have to explain 
her motivation for behaving in a particular way.  This lack of explanation is what 
distinguishes confessions from apologies. 
 Apologies 
 Set apart from accounts (or at least a special type of account), but falling in line 
with Goffman’s (1955) suggestion of an offering, are apologies.  Apologies have been 
defined and conceptualized in many ways, but all have common components.  One of the 
most cited definitions for apology comes from Schlenker and Darby (1981), who defined 
apologies as “admissions of blameworthiness and regret by the actor” (p. 271).  Like 
excuses and justifications, apologies establish a link between a transgressor’s action and 
its consequences.  However, unlike excuses and justifications, when one makes an 
apology, one assumes full responsibility for the action and its consequences (Fukuno & 
Ohbuchi, 1998; Itoi et al., 1996; Kim et al., 2004; Petrucci, 2002), intended or unintended 
(Cohen, 1999). 
 Lazare (2006) offered a look at the structure of an apology.  He identified four 
parts of an apology and noted that, although all parts are not required for an effective 
apology, if an apology is deemed ineffective, the failure can likely be traced back to a 
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defect in one or more of the parts  (see also Regehr & Gutheil, 2002; Scher & Darley, 
1997).  Lazare posited that the first step in any apology is acknowledgment; one cannot 
apologize (or give any account, for that matter), without first recognizing that some 
violation has occurred.  Like excuses and justifications, the next step in apology comes 
when the transgressor attempts to explain his behavior.  This explanation is similar to 
what one might offer in an excuse or justification, but will include acceptance of 
responsibility, something not included in an explanation that accompanies an excuse or 
justification.  Lazare further pointed out that explanations might serve to aggravate or 
mitigate the circumstances of the situation.  Further, he suggested, explanations are not 
always appropriate or warranted, such as when one says, “There is no explanation I can 
offer for what happened.”  The explanation offered with an apology essentially serves the 
same purpose as an explanation does when it is part of an excuse (“This is why X 
occurred”), but the acceptance of responsibility in an apology sets the explanation apart 
from the explanation in an excuse.  As I will discuss below, this explanation (or perhaps 
its lack) can play a large role in a victim’s reaction, and might, as Lazare suggested, 
change the dynamics of the situation, making it better or, in some cases, worse.  After the 
offender has offered his explanation, he will express “remorse, shame, forbearance, and 
humility” (p. 1401).  Each of these expressions will convey to the victim that the 
transgressor recognizes his violation and registers the appropriate emotional response to 
causing the victim harm.  Finally, the transgressor will offer some type of reparation, 
although the transgressor might not explicitly state what she will pay (Wagatsuma & 
Rosett, 1986). 
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 Lazare’s (2006) four-part typology is in line with other research.  Specifically, 
Anderson and Prkachin (1998 as cited in Anderson, Linden, & Habra, 2006, p. 348) 
identified six verbal components of apologies:  explicit expression of remorse, specific 
statement of why one feels remorse, acceptance of responsibility, truthful explanation for 
offensive behavior without trying to excuse the offense and shirk responsibility, promise 
of forbearance, and an offer of restitution.  (See also Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986, for a 
similar outline.) 
 Unlike the other accounts listed above, the desire to alleviate anger is what drives 
apology (Itoi et al., 1996; McPherson Frantz & Bennigson, 2005).  Thus, while excuse, 
justification, and denial all involve the desire to avoid punishment, a self-focused desire, 
apologies, in their pure form, appear to be focused solely on the relationship with the 
other (other-focused), addressing the victim’s “face-needs” (i.e., need to restore one’s 
previous image of oneself; Harris, Grainger, & Mullany, 2006).  While apologies may 
serve other functions (e.g., reducing anger and retaliation, see Ohbuchi, Kameda, & 
Agarie, 1989), they help the victim’s “face” by acknowledging the victim’s less-than-
ideal situation and accepting responsibility.  In essence, when one apologizes, she is 
saying, “I realize my action has put you in this situation and out of respect I accept 
responsibility for my action and its effect on you.”  This contrasts with excuses or 
justifications, in which the actor might recognize the victim’s situation, but does not 
signal respect by accepting responsibility for her actions. 
 Knowing the different kinds of accounts people employ, one question researchers 
have investigated is why offenders feel the need to offer accounts.  The next section will 
address this issue. 
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CHAPTER 3:  After the Transgression:  Why Offenders Offer Accounts 
 In what cases do people offer accounts?  What warrants an account and what are 
the ramifications of transgressions and accounts?  Because of fundamental shifts in 
relationships when one party has wronged the other, accounts become essential in 
restoring the relationship to its pre-transgression state (Kelley, 1998).  Exline, Deshea, 
and Holeman (2007) reported that wrongdoers who do not apologize often do not receive 
the benefits of establishing (or re-establishing) personal relationships.  In the following 
section I will attempt to explain why accounts are essential to rebuilding relationships for 
both the transgressor and victim. 
Cognitive Dissonance 
 One well-known phenomenon in social psychology is that of cognitive 
dissonance.  Put simply, cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s actions and beliefs do 
not match (Festinger, 1957).  In one of the first studies of cognitive dissonance, Festinger 
and Carlsmith (1959) had participants engage in a boring task of placing spools on a tray, 
removing them, and placing them back on the tray.  After spooling and re-spooling for 30 
minutes, participants turned pegs on a board for an additional 30 minutes.  Participants 
then agreed to speak with an incoming participant in exchange for either $1 or $20.  Most 
participants told the incoming participant the task had been interesting and enjoyable.  
After the second participant went to participate in the task, researchers asked the first 
participants about their reaction to the task (e.g., how enjoyable it was).  The results 
indicated that participants who received $1 rated the task as more enjoyable than did 
those who received $20.  The researchers explained these findings by suggesting that 
participants who received only $1 had inadequate justification for their behavior (i.e., 
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lying to the second participant) and therefore changed their attitudes to match their 
behavior (changing from thinking the task was boring to thinking it was enjoyable to 
justify telling the second participant the task was enjoyable).  Participants who received 
$20, on the other hand, felt justified lying to the second participant because the payoff 
was enough to legitimize their behavior. 
 This study (as well as other cognitive dissonance research) might provide an 
explanation for why people offer apologies.  People generally have positive views of 
themselves (Alicke, 1985), so when they engage in behavior which is not consistent with 
that view (e.g., committing some transgression), they might offer an apology to reconcile 
the discrepancy.  For example, if Grace thinks she is a good person but offends Anne, she 
might offer Anne an apology to help restore her image of herself. 
Norms 
 In terms of the relationship between the victim and the offender, social norms 
dictate that when one has wronged another in some way, he shall first acknowledge some 
wrong has occurred (i.e., one has violated expectations for his behavior), and then he 
shall make reparations for the act and its consequences. Goffman (1955, p. 95) suggested 
that “a social norm is that kind of guide for action which is supported by social 
sanctions...The significance of these rewards and penalties is not meant to lie in their 
intrinsic, substantive worth but in what they proclaim about the moral status of the actor.”  
As Semin and Manstead (1983) put it, “the pervasive aspect of the accountability of 
social conduct as a general feature of social existence is that it is an essential and 
undismissable desideratum for orderly social interaction at any level” (p. 173, italics in 
original).  Tavuchis (1991) echoed these sentiments, noting that social order depends on 
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its members’ commitment to social norms.  These norms, he argues, are essential to 
society running smoothly and are often unnoticed until something occurs which draws 
attention to them.  Apologies, then, which occur after a norm-disrupting behavior, serve 
as indicators of the actor’s “moral orientation” and also “register tensions and 
displacements in personal and public belief systems” (p. 13).  The pervasiveness and 
inherent nature of these norms are apparent even in young children, who learn and 
demonstrate the knowledge that when one has transgressed, one must, in some way, offer 
a reparation for her action (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982, 1989; Ebert, 2008; Ohbuchi & 
Sato, 1994). 
 Apologies, according to Scher and Darley (1997), relay that the actor is aware of 
the social requirement to apologize.  As Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, and Evans (1998) 
remarked, the general expectation is that people will treat others in a positive way.  When 
negative treatment occurs, then, people react to it as an unexpected event and, in turn, it 
becomes more salient to them.  Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005) agreed, commenting 
that “most individuals expect that moral norms should prevail and that they are entitled to 
fair procedures and treatment...” (p. 638).  Bowing to this social pressure can be 
problematic, however.  Exline and colleagues (2007) noted, for instance, that oftentimes 
offenders will offer apologies due to external pressure, but they will not internalize the 
apology, refusing to accept blame for the situation.  Due to social pressure and norms, a 
victim may feel that she has to accept an apology from a transgressor, even if she does 
not really wish to, because norms dictate that once an apology has been offered, the 
victim should accept (McPherson-Frantz & Bennigson, 2005) and perhaps even has a 
responsibility to do so (Bennett & Dewberry, 1994; Stubbs, 2007).  When an offender 
13 
 
makes a very public display of his apology, the burden falls to the victim to respond, and, 
in an effort to save face or not appear unforgiving, the victim might, however grudgingly, 
accept the proffered apology.  Indeed, Risen and Gilovich (2007) noted that participants 
not only wanted to accept apologies more than reject them, they also felt that they should 
accept the apologies (see also Kelley, 1998).  Even when faced with an insincere 
apology, participants reported that they were more likely to accept it than reject it, even 
though their desire was to reject the insincere apology.  As the authors wrote, 
“participants’ predictions of how likely they would be to accept or reject a given apology 
followed not their desires but their sense of obligation” (p. 426). 
Balance Theory  
 In maintaining relationships, balance plays a key role.  Heider (1958) offered a 
discussion of the importance of balance in maintaining relationships.  A balanced state 
occurs when “the relations among the entities fit together harmoniously; there is no stress 
towards change” (Heider, 1958, p. 201).  Heider conceptualized balanced relationships in 
terms of a triad.  In relationships there are two entities (p and o, respectively) and some 
mutual object (x).  Balance occurs when evaluations are consistent among the three 
entities.  For example, if George (p) likes Martha (o), a positive relationship exists 
between them.  Further, assume Martha (o) likes vineyards (x).  This, too, is a positive 
relationship.  Finally, one must ask if George (p) likes vineyards (x).  If he does, the 
relationship is balanced:  George likes Martha, Martha likes vineyards, George likes 
vineyards; all of the relationships are positive.  Similarly, balance exists when there are 
two negative relationships and one positive relationship.  For example, if George (p) 
dislikes Martha (o), and Martha (o) dislikes vineyards (x), but George (p) likes vineyards 
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(x), a balanced relationship still exists.  In this situation, George’s like of vineyards does 
not conflict with his dislike of Martha or her dislike of vineyards:  If Martha does not like 
vineyards and George does not like Martha, he should feel no discomfort/imbalance for 
liking vineyards.  If, however, George does not like vineyards, an imbalanced 
relationship results; if he likes Martha, it follows that he should like what she does.  (This 
holds true for things about which people hold strong attitudes; if Martha really, really 
likes vineyards but George really, really dislikes them the imbalance will be greater than 
if Martha only marginally likes vineyards and George only marginally dislikes them.)  To 
achieve balance, George must either reconsider his attitude toward Martha or his attitude 
toward vineyards.  As Robbennolt (2008) more recently observed, “wrongdoing results in 
a moral imbalance in the relationship,” which prompts the parties involved to seek some 
resolution to the conflict. 
 Indeed, after an injured party accepts the apology from the transgressor, balance 
returns to the relationship and it can develop in an unimpeded manner (Petrucci, 2002).  
Cohen (1999) suggested that, “having been harmed, the injured party may view the 
offender as an adversary, and expect that what will be one side’s gain will be the other 
side’s loss” (p. 4).  After an infraction has occurred, an imbalance exists within the 
relationship:  the transgressor has placed the victim in some devalued position.  An 
apology acts as a weight, in a certain respect.  When the offender offers it to his victim, 
he is indicating that this commodity will remove the victim from his devalued position 
(Cohen, 1999; Leape, 2005). 
 The mere offering of an account does not restore the relationship, however.  Once 
a victim has received the offer of an account, it is up to him to decide whether or not to 
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accept it.  If the victim accepts the apology, the two parties return to an equal footing.  If 
the victim does not accept the account, however, the imbalance remains in the 
relationship.  (The likelihood of a victim rejecting an apology is relatively small.  Even in 
situations in which normal social consequences of rejecting an apology are absent, 
participants overwhelmingly accepted an offender’s apology, even in the face of 
considerable provocation (Bennett & Earwaker, 1994; see also Bornstein, Rung, & 
Miller, 2002).  In this instance, however, the transgressor becomes the person in the 
devalued position.  (For a discussion of the implications of victims rejecting an account, 
see the discussion below.)  In view of this loss-gain perspective, one can see how the 
dynamics of a relationship might shift after a transgression.  An effective account, 
however, can restore the relationship to balance. 
Attribution 
 Another reason for the presence of accounts after a transgression involves 
attribution.  As a victim, one is likely to ask why some harmful event occurred and will 
seek to answer this question.  As Petrucci (2002) commented, people have a basic need to 
understand their social world.  Crime victims often wonder, “Why did this happen to 
me?”  Attributions help make sense of the social world and, as people can better 
understand what is happening, the better they can control and predict events in their 
world.  Although a transgressor might not offer an explanation for why she chose a 
particular victim, her account (with the exception of denial) can address the “Why?” if 
not the “Why me?”  Attribution research, therefore, provides helpful insight into how 
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people perceive events and their causes.  Research shows, however, that people are 
susceptible to making errors in attribution.1 
 Fundamental Attribution Error 
 One of the most established principles in attribution research is the presence of 
the fundamental attribution error (FAE; Ross, 1977).  According to the FAE, when 
attempting to explain another person’s behavior, one focuses primarily on the other’s 
disposition, rather than considering situational factors.  As Heider (1958) suggested, 
“anything that is caused by p is ascribed to him” (p. 112); p was a necessary condition for 
some event to have occurred.  By attributing another’s behavior to something stable (i.e., 
personality), people can account for another’s behavior across a variety of situations, thus 
providing them with some understanding and control.  For example, if I believe John to 
be dishonest because I witnessed him engage in questionable behavior one time, I should 
be able to believe he will be dishonest in any situation.  This belief will save me time and 
mental energy when I encounter John in another situation, as I can say, “I know he is 
dishonest, therefore I do not need to try and figure out why he is behaving in a particular 
way in this (other) situation.” 
 Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990) provided evidence that victims of 
transgressions reported attributing perpetrators’ actions to personality-type causes (e.g., 
they saw the perpetrators’ actions as inconsistent, immoral, deliberately cruel).  Victims 
further reported that they believed the perpetrators’ actions were senseless.  Successful 
apologies, with their promise of avoiding such behavior in the future, might serve to 
alleviate these character-damning attributions, then, as the wrongdoer’s apology might 
                                                 
1
 The field of attribution research is vast and this discussion is by no means exhaustive.  For 
brevity, I will focus on two of the most common attribution errors:  the fundamental attribution 
error and the actor-observer effect. 
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indicate that she will effect change in such a way (e.g., take care to be more careful in 
similar future interactions) as to avoid future wrongs. 
 Actor-Observer Effect 
 Another, related attribution bias frequently discussed is the actor-observer effect 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972).  According to this effect, people make different attributions 
depending on whether they are the actor or observer in a situation.  When one is an actor, 
one makes attributions about her own behavior based on the situation, but when 
observing others’ behavior makes attributions based on personality.  Interestingly, by 
simply having people change physical perspectives, researchers have been able to 
ameliorate this effect (Storms, 1973).  That is, by having actors take the physical 
perspective of another person, researchers have shown that participants will then make 
more situational attributions of the other person and more dispositional attributions about 
themselves.  Takaku, Weiner, and Ohbuchi (2001; Takaku, 2001) provided support for 
this in the realm of wrongdoing, reporting that when participants imagined situations in 
which they recalled themselves as wrongdoers, they “perceived the cause of the wrong 
[committed by another person] to be significantly less controllable” (p. 161).  Takaku et 
al. explained these results in terms of participants’ views of themselves.  According to the 
authors, when people think of themselves as wrongdoers, they feel a certain sense of 
hypocrisy in negatively judging others for their infractions.  Hypocrisy also made 
participants more concerned with the justice and fairness of the situation.  As this sense 
of hypocrisy increases, people tend to believe the cause of the infraction is more 
uncontrollable and thus have less negative emotional reactions to the wrong.  Ultimately, 
this leads to greater forgiveness on the part of the participant. 
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 Research in the realm of transgressions and forgiveness supports these differing 
attributions.  Baumeister and colleagues (1990), for example, had participants recall 
events in which they were the victim of some wrong and also recall incidents in which 
they perpetrated some wrong.  Analyses revealed that one’s role in a transgression affects 
how one constructs an event, and discrepancies arise in terms of victims’ and 
perpetrators’ explanations.  When recalling themselves as perpetrators, participants 
construed the event as something brief.  They also tended to believe the harmful event 
was an “uncharacteristic episode” (p. 1000) and bore little on present circumstances.  In 
another study (Leary et al., 1998). when asked about their responsibility in a harmful 
event, both victims and perpetrators placed greater responsibility on the other party than 
they took for themselves.  Perpetrators also focused more on their lack of culpability for 
an incident by claiming it was an accident (i.e., they attributed blame to the situation) or 
that the victim played a part in the incident and therefore deserved the negative outcome. 
 Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003) found a similar pattern, noting that in 
relationships among friends, perpetrators did little to offer mitigating evidence, but still 
expected positive outcomes and enhanced future relationships with their friends.  One 
potential explanation for this is that perpetrators do not understand how much victims 
dislike them and their actions, thereby underestimating a victim’s anger about the event 
(Leary et al., 1998).  Indeed, Baumeister and his associates (1990) remarked that victims 
sometimes do not make their true feelings known, which can lead harmdoers to believe 
their actions were not as harmful. 
 On the other hand, when recalling themselves as victims, participants reported 
seeing the event as something ongoing, with the negative repercussions continuing after 
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the event has occurred (Baumeister et al., 1990).  Baumeister and his colleagues further 
noted that, in retrospect, perpetrators could provide explanations for their misdeeds, while 
victims reported having difficulty making sense of the harmful episode, even after 
considerable time had passed between the incident and recall.  Interestingly, the 
participants in this study recalled themselves as victims and perpetrators, but did not 
appear to be aware of the discrepancies in their reports of harmful events.  These 
inconsistencies in recall might help explain how conflict and anger can arise. 
 Barclay et al.  (2005) noted, for example, that the attribution one makes will affect 
the association one makes between the harmful event and one’s emotional reaction to the 
event.  In other words, as the injustice of the event increases, so too should the person’s 
negative emotional reaction to the event.  Barclay and his colleagues went on to note that 
the more a victim perceives an event as unjust, the more outward-focused his emotions 
will be; outward-focused emotions include things such as anger and hostility.  Factors 
increasing such emotional reactions include how blameworthy the victim perceives the 
transgressor to be for what has transpired and how avoidable the victim believes the 
incident to have been.  Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998) reported similar findings, 
such that participants primed to feel anger were more punitive than their control 
counterparts.  Dyck and Rule (1978) also found that men were more likely to retaliate 
against a harmdoer when they perceived that the harmdoer was aware of the negative 
outcomes his actions would cause. 
 Another situational factor exerting influence over the type of account offered is 
the presence of mitigating circumstances (Ohbuchi, Suzuki, & Takaku, 2003).  The more 
mitigating circumstances present, the less responsible the offender felt and therefore the 
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less responsibility he would take for the offense.  When an offender considered 
mitigating circumstances to be present, she felt less responsible and also expected the 
victim to view her as less responsible.  However, because victims rarely consider the 
situational circumstances contributing to a transgressor’s behavior, this seems an unlikely 
outcome for the transgressor.  As McLaughlin, Cody, and O’Hair (1983) found, 
perpetrators preferred excuse as their social account for transgressions, which the authors 
took to “reflect the fact that most people in judging their own behavior attribute failure to 
the circumstances of the situation rather than to their own bad intentions” (p. 222).  
Transgressors may offer apologies, however, when there are few mitigating 
circumstances present (e.g, Jaime bumped into Brian in an empty hallway versus a 
crowded one) or when they are willing to accept responsibility for a situation.  For 
example, Khara might take responsibility for running into Jeff’s car, even though the 
streets were icy.  It is not so much that an apologizer does not consider situational forces 
on his actions, but rather he accepts responsibility for the consequences, one element 
which is missing from both excuses and justifications. 
 Legally speaking, foreseeability can have implications for one’s culpability.  One 
commits an intentional tort, for example, if she causes harm deliberately and 
purposefully.  Further, one might commit an intentional tort if she is substantially certain 
that her act will have intended harmful consequences.  One is negligent if she is aware of 
a foreseeable risk (one a reasonable person would recognize) but acts anyway.   In this 
sense, when one is very certain her actions will produce a particular outcome, she may 
face more severe consequences for her actions.  As stated in the Restatement of Torts 
(Second Edition, 2000, p. 45), “Normally the actor has much less reason to anticipate 
21 
 
intentional misconduct than he has to anticipate negligence.  In the ordinary case he may 
reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will not interfere in a manner 
intended to cause harm to anyone.”  This coincides with the concept of norms, in that a 
person who knowingly violates a norm and knows her violation will likely result in some 
negative consequence might face harsher judgments (both legally and socially) from 
others than one who acts without knowledge of these standards. 
Self-Protection  
 Attributions, then, can have serious implications for the victim and transgressor.  
The effects of a transgression on the harmdoer herself, regardless of the effects on the 
victim, also provide an impetus for offering an apology.  Specifically, one’s view of 
oneself can be threatened after one has committed some wrong.  Overall, people have 
positive views of themselves (Alicke, 1985).  When one acts inconsistently, her self-
concept (“face”) is threatened.  For example, if Jane believes herself to be a kind person, 
but says something cruel to Olivia, her self-concept is threatened, as she acted in a 
manner inconsistent with her positive view of herself. 
 Cognitive dissonance is one way to explain why people offer apologies in terms 
of self-protection.  As described above, cognitive dissonance can occur when one’s 
actions and attitudes are inconsistent.  If one behaves in a way that is inconsistent with 
one’s self-view, an apology can help restore the original positive self-view.  The severity 
of the transgression, then, can affect what type of account one offers.  For example, 
bumping into someone in a crowded hallway might only warrant a hasty, “I’m sorry” 
because the transgression is relatively minor (and somewhat unavoidable) and does not 
threaten one’s positive self-view.  Forgetting to mail someone’s bills, on the other hand, 
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can have relatively serious consequences (e.g., resulting in more serious consequences) 
and therefore more threatening to one’s self-image, resulting in a more thorough apology. 
Goffman (1955) provided a definitive overview of people’s fundamental need to 
“save face.”    This need arises when we have acted in a way which threatens our self-
concept (i.e., our “face”).  According to Goffman, people possess certain “faces” which 
are in essence their identities.  Faces come about from a combination of factors, including 
a person’s internally consistent image of himself, feedback from others that is consistent 
with one’s image, and feedback from “impersonal agencies in the situation.”  As a person 
becomes more aware of himself, he becomes attached to the image he has created and 
others form expectations about his image as well.  When something occurs to threaten 
that face, he is in wrong face, which can lead to negative feelings.  Further, when he is in 
wrong face, he is likely to experience negative emotional reactions such as shame and 
guilt due to his action and its effects on others’ perceptions of him and his own 
perception of himself.  Consistent with the idea of norms, Goffman suggested that “as an 
aspect of the social code of any social circle, one may expect to find an understanding as 
to how far a person should go to save his face” (p. 215).  Goffman also noted the 
importance of saving others’ faces as well.  According to Goffman, “just as the member 
of any group is expected to have self-respect, so also he is expected to sustain a standard 
of considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face 
of others present…” (p. 215). 
 Because one’s face is partly socially constructed, the threats to one’s self-image 
can be both internal and external.  Barnlund and Yoshioka (1990; see also Finkelstein, 
Wu, Holtzman, & Smith, 1997) pointed out that admissions of failure are particularly 
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distressing and can negatively impact one’s self-esteem. For example, physicians are 
often reluctant to admit their mistakes because of their desire to protect their reputations 
(Leape, 2005) or maintain the image others have of them as “strong, always in charge, 
unemotional, and a perfectionist” (Lazare, 2006, p. 1403).  Leary and colleagues (1998) 
agreed, asserting that “perpetrators in particular may be motivated to disclaim 
responsibility, given that another person was hurt by their actions” (p. 1235).  They went 
on to suggest that perpetrators attempt to minimize “the degree to which they rejected and 
disliked the person they hurt” (p. 1235), possibly to maintain their positive self-concept. 
 While offenders might be reluctant to apologize in order to save face, some are 
motivated to apologize by a desire to obtain forgiveness from the injured party.  Kelley 
(1998), for example, found that victims were more likely to forgive transgressors when 
the transgressor apologized.  He further reported that desires to restore one’s sense of 
well-being and balance to the relationship were important motivations to forgive 
transgressors. 
 It seems unlikely that these two motivations (i.e., saving face, obtaining 
forgiveness) will co-exist in the same situation.  Forgiveness (sometimes) follows an 
apology (e.g., McCullough et al., 1997; but see Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, who found that 
an apology failed to promote forgiveness of an outgroup when that group offered an 
apology for offending behavior), which necessarily involves accepting responsibility.  
Disclaiming responsibility in order to save face, however, is distinctly not an apology.  It 
is unlikely therefore, that one disclaiming responsibility would attain forgiveness from 
his victim.  Although the transgressor might be motivated to receive forgiveness, if his 
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need to save face outweighs his need for forgiveness, it appears unlikely that he will be 
able to reach both goals. 
 The causes of an adverse event have implications for how protective one becomes 
of one’s self-image as well.  Ohbuchi et al. (2003) remarked that offenders reported 
preferring apologies, but situational variables affected which account they would offer to 
a victim.  In cases of medical errors (e.g., Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Fraser, & 
Levinson, 2003) or in legal settings (e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986), for example, 
transgressors report the desire to apologize but often do not for fear that the apology will 
be taken as an admission of guilt.  One such variable was the victim’s expectation about 
what he deserved:  The more a victim demanded from the offender, the more likely it was 
that the offender would produce a responsibility-rejecting account (Ohbuchi et al., 2003).  
The victim’s demand for compensation made the offender defensive and thus less likely 
to accept responsibility for the event and its outcomes.  This defensiveness, in turn, 
indicates to the victim that the transgressor is not committed to repairing the relationship, 
leading to greater dissatisfaction for the victim (Ashforth & Lee, 1990). 
Self-Presentation 
 Transgressors, then, will frequently offer some type of account due to norms, to 
restore a relationship to its previous state and/or to save face.  Even if one does not feel a 
particular action requires some form of an account, one might still offer an account in 
order to present a positive image to others.  Self-presentation involves an attempt to have 
others perceive oneself in a particular way (Jones & Pittman, 1982).  Strategic self-
presentation is particularly relevant to the issues of apology and account making.  
According to Jones and Pittman, people engage in strategic self-presentation when they 
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believe another’s view of them is particularly important.  In this case they make a 
conscious effort to convey a particular self to another person.  In fact, one of the motives 
associated with account making is the desire to minimize others’ negative reactions (Itoi 
et al., 1996; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvan, 2008). 
 In their seminal work on self-presentation, Jones and Pittman (1982) identified 
five strategies of self-presentation:  ingratiation, self-promotion, intimidation, 
exemplification, and supplication.  In terms of offenses and self-presentation, ingratiation 
fits most closely with the motives of the offender.  The purpose of ingratiation is to get 
another to view oneself in a positive way; to increase liking.  As Jones and Pittman put it, 
“the very success of ingratiation usually depends on the actor’s concealment of ulterior 
motivation or of the importance of his stake in being judged attractive” (p. 236). 
 According to Jones and Pittman (1982, p. 237), there are three factors which 
affect the effectiveness of ingratiation.  The first factor, incentive value, concerns the 
importance that a target will like the self-presenter.  The higher the incentive value (i.e., 
the more one hopes the target will like him), the greater the ingratiation techniques.  For 
example, a criminal might hope ingratiation will attract the judge, leading to a more 
lenient sentence.  The criminal, therefore, might engage in behavior which will ingratiate 
himself to the judge in order to increase liking.  The second factor Jones and Pittman 
identified is subjective probability, as “determined by the subjective probability of its [the 
ingratiation technique] success and the inverse probability that a boomerang effect 
(decreased attraction) will occur” (p. 237).  Jones and Pittman noted the existence of an 
ingratiator’s dilemma, which involves an inverse relationship between motivation to 
ingratiate and the likelihood of successfully ingratiating.  The motivation to ingratiate 
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increases as an actor becomes more dependent on the target; at the same time, the 
likelihood of successful ingratiation decreases.  The proffered explanation for this is that, 
as one becomes more dependent on another, the possibility for ulterior motives becomes 
salient.  To continue with the above example, the criminal is highly dependent on the 
judge for a lenient sentence.  However, due to this “dependency discrepancy,” the judge 
(as well as outside observers) might become more aware of the criminal’s needs and his 
likelihood of ingratiating for an ulterior motive.  To combat this, the criminal “must go 
out of his way to establish his credibility, especially in those settings where extreme 
dependence might make his credibility suspect” (p. 237).  The final component involves 
perceived legitimacy, which involves balancing “authenticity” with “impression 
management.”  Thus, the criminal will want to make his overtures with an appearance of 
sincerity (for a discussion of sincerity, see below), but also in a way that will attract the 
judge to him. 
 In an attempt to repair a relationship, one would most likely employ ingratiation 
in order to get the victim to like him or her and, ideally, to promote forgiveness.  In his 
meta-analysis of the ingratiation literature, Gordon (1996) concluded that ingratiation is 
an effective technique for targets; they react more positively after one attempts 
ingratiation.  Gordon attributes this tendency to people’s inability to remain unaffected 
when another has paid them some compliment or reaffirmed their views by agreeing with 
them.  In terms of apology, when a transgressor offers an apology, she is saying to the 
victim, “You are right to be upset with me for my actions.  My apology/acceptance of 
responsibility is my indication to you that your view of me is correct,” which verifies the 
victim’s view of the transgressor and therefore ingratiates the transgressor to the victim.  
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Observers, however, are more skeptical, questioning the ingratiator’s motives for his 
behavior.  Research (e.g., Ohbuchi et al., 2003) has supported this skepticism.  Ohbuchi 
and colleagues reported that, in the absence of strong mitigating information, 
transgressors reported being more concerned with others liking them.  Self-presentation 
concerns influenced which account transgressors were willing to provide. 
 Self-promotion is another self-presentation technique which might fit in the realm 
of apology and account making.  According to Jones and Pittman (1982), self-promotion 
does not focus on getting others to see oneself as likable, but rather as competent.  If a 
doctor is trying to convince his patient to follow a prescribed course of treatment, for 
example, it may be less important that the patient like the doctor and more important that 
the patient respect the doctor.  (It is worth noting, as did Jones and Pittman, that self-
presentation strategies need not be mutually exclusive.  It is entirely possible for one to 
attract a person via ingratiation and also convince her of one’s competence via self-
promotion.)  Self-promotion, like ingratiation, can occur in situations in which power is 
not balanced.  A student, for example, might try to promote herself to her teacher in order 
to show her knowledge of a particular subject.  A criminal might engage in self-
promotion by apologizing, effectively relaying that he understands his misdeed and 
accepts responsibility for what he has done.  In this instance one might interpret his 
“competence” as his ability to acknowledge his wrongdoing and offer a socially 
acceptable response.  
CHAPTER 4:  The Effects of Accounts on Victims and Transgressors 
 As discussed above, transgressors have multiple motives for offering apologies 
and accounts when some wrong has occurred.  Further, victims have their own motives 
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for accepting apologies and sometimes face constraints and pressures to accept such 
accounts from transgressors.  Although social psychological concepts such as norms and 
balance theory can help explain why accounts are offered and accepted, there still remains 
the discussion of what effects these accounts have for both the victim and the 
transgressor.  In this section I will discuss the various effects accounts can have for the 
parties involved (and parties not involved).  I will also discuss some moderating variables 
that can affect the impact of an account. 
Effective Apologies 
 Consistent with the elements Lazare (2006) and Anderson and Prkachin (1998 as 
cited in Anderson et al., 2006) laid out, much research has been done to determine what 
makes an effective apology.  In an early work on the topic, Schlenker and Darby (1981) 
had participants rate various accounts.  Participants rated perfunctory apologetic 
responses (e.g., “Pardon me” or “I’m sorry”) as relatively incomplete, whereas they rated 
statements in which the transgressor “offered help or asked for forgiveness as the most 
complete” (Schlenker & Darby, 1981, p. 276).  (None of the proffered apologies 
contained an element of explanation for the event, however; the scenario participants 
encountered involved an obvious accident (one person bumping into another in a 
crowded place).  The authors did suggest, however, that as a wrongdoer’s intent becomes 
clearer, self-serving accounts (i.e., excuses, justifications) might be more appropriate.  
One reason the “Pardon me” apologies seemed incomplete is that they lacked self-blame.  
Participants simply did not see transgressors merely offering an “I’m sorry” as truly 
accepting blame for the situation, which is a central aspect of apology.  Instead, when 
transgressors explicitly blamed themselves for their transgressions, participants viewed 
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the apologies as most complete.  As Scher and Darley (1997) put it, “an apology without 
an expression of remorse (e.g., ‘I apologize’; ‘Pardon me’) generally seems to be 
perfunctory or formal, indicating the illocutionary force of apology, without conveying 
information about the emotional state of the transgressor” (p. 130).  Petrucci (2002, p. 
354) provided a list of what the result of a truly effective apology establishes: 
[A]n accepted social norm that has been broken is identified; the social identities of the 
actors involved are repaired; acceptance of responsibility and expression of regret have 
been clearly communicated; forgiveness has occurred; a step toward conflict resolution 
has been made; and often punishment has been reduced, ostensibly because harsher 
punishments may not be deemed necessary. 
 In terms of resolving social conflict, participants seem to prefer apologies more 
than other types of accounts (Itoi et al., 1996; Schlenker & Darby, 1981).  As Schlenker 
and Darby (1981) noted, participants rated apologies as the preferred method for dealing 
with conflict.  One reason for this is that the forbearance inherent in an apology conveys 
to the victim that the transgressor regrets her behavior and will take steps to avoid such 
behavior in the future, thereby avoiding more infractions (Scher & Darley, 1997).  This is 
not to say, however, that accounts are not effective in dealing with social conflict.  One 
study, for example, found that Americans viewed exculpatory explanations and apologies 
in the same way, but only when the explanation carried with it the transgressor’s promise 
not to engage in similar behavior in the future (Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986).  Fukuno and 
Ohbuchi (1998; see also Takaku, 2000) reported that offenders offering what they termed 
a “mitigative account” (i.e., excuse or apology) received more positive evaluations than 
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offenders offering an “assertive account” (i.e., justification or denial).  Mitigative 
accounts also helped reduce negative emotions on the part of the victims. 
Effects of Accounts on Views of Transgressors  
 The previous section noted that transgressors often offer accounts as a means of 
impression management; they seek to protect their own view of themselves as well as 
offer a better image of themselves to victims and observers.  As Scher and Darley (1997) 
put it, “an apology seeks to change the beliefs of listeners regarding the informativeness 
of the transgression regarding the type of person the speaker is” (p. 129).  The apology 
also helps create two “selves” for the transgressor:  the “bad self” responsible for the 
harm and the “good self” which is offering the apology and is more characteristic of the 
transgressor (Scher & Darley, 1997; Schlenker & Darby, 1981). 
 Overall, research indicates that apologizing is an effective technique of 
impression management.  One of the most robust findings in the apology literature is that 
people report having more positive views of offenders who offer apologies (and 
sometimes other accounts) for their actions (e.g., Goei, Roberto, Meyer, & Carlyle, 2007; 
Robbennolt, 2003; Sitkin & Bies, 1993; Takaku, 2000).  By apologizing, offenders 
acknowledge some norm violation and the victim’s right to feel how she is feeling; the 
cost of apologizing (i.e., publicly losing face) might indicate to the victim that the 
offender is serious about his apology (Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter, 1990), 
which might lead to more positive judgments by the victims.  Similarly, Ohbuchi et al. 
(1989) noted that participants not only preferred transgressors who apologized over those 
who did not, but they also had less negative feelings toward them and were less inclined 
to react aggressively toward them.  Some research has even suggested that in cases where 
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doctors apologize to patients the number of medical malpractice suits decreases 
(Newfield, 2007).  Even children demonstrate the tendency to judge apologizers more 
favorably.  Ohbuchi and Sato (2001) gathered data from fifth-graders, whose reactions 
were similar to those of adults:  When a transgressor apologized for his actions, the fifth-
graders had more positive reactions.  Specifically, they believed him less at fault for the 
action, they assigned more remorse to him, and they did not blame him as much for what 
transpired. 
 An important element influencing impressions of offenders is perceived remorse 
for an action.  As Lazare (2004, p. 107) conceptualized it, remorse is a “deep, painful 
regret that is part of the guilt people experience when they have done something wrong.”  
An essential element of remorse, according to Lazare, involves accepting responsibility; 
one must accept responsibility for the outcome of one’s actions and focus on the harm 
one caused (Semin & Manstead, 1983).  Remorse, if sincere, should also indicate 
forbearance on the part of the offender; essentially promising to avoid such harm-causing 
behavior in the future.  This can lead to less negative impressions of the harmdoer on the 
part of the victim (Semin & Manstead, 1983).  A lack of remorse, on the other hand, 
might indicate that the offender “may not share the moral standards of the rest of society 
and, thus, is at risk to repeat the wrongful act” (Lazare, 2004, p. 111). 
Although apologies generally produce more positive outcomes for transgressors, they 
sometimes actually increase negative evaluations.  One instance in which this often 
occurs is when no clear harmdoer exists.  In one study, denial proved more effective than 
apology at rebuilding trust between parties, but only in cases where evidence of the 
harmdoer’s innocence existed (Kim et al., 2004).  When a party apologizes and his guilt 
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is not clear, participants may react more negatively.  This is just what Zechmeister, 
Garcia, Romero, and Vas (2004) found.  Their results showed that participants displayed 
increased blame for experimenters and had more retaliatory responses toward them when 
they apologized for administering an incorrect test than when they offered no apology.  
The authors posited that this occurred because, before receiving (or not receiving) an 
apology, the experimenters’ culpability was unclear.  When they apologized, however, 
they assumed the culpability and therefore it became easier to blame them for the 
negative outcome.  Boccaccini, Clark, John, and Mundt (2008) reported similar results.  
They had participants read Kobe Bryant’s public statement stemming from charges of 
sexual assault.  The authors manipulated whether Bryant’s statement was the actual one 
issued (which contained an apology) or whether the statement contained no apology but 
instead contained an expression of vindication for having the criminal charges dropped.  
The results showed that, overall, participants, regardless of condition, did not believe 
Bryant was guilty of sexual assault or that the accuser deserved monetary compensation.  
Of the participants who believed in Bryant’s guilt, however, significantly more read the 
statement containing the apology rather than the vindication.  One possible interpretation 
for these findings is that Bryant’s guilt was not clear and therefore reading the apology 
made it appear as though he was accepting responsibility for something he might not 
have done. 
 In cases of clear guilt, wrongdoers fared better with a confession and worse with a 
denial. Weiner and colleagues (1991) and Robbennolt (2003) reported that a partial 
apology was actually harmful for the transgressor when the responsibility for the incident 
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was clear, but was somewhat beneficial when the responsibility was somewhat more 
ambiguous. 
 Sometimes the victim’s reaction to a negative event affects whether he will 
receive any type of account.  A number of researchers (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1990) have 
noted that if a victim does not draw attention to the negative event, offenders might not 
be likely to offer any account because they are unaware of having caused offense.  The 
authors went on to remark that if an offender continues this behavior, the victim might 
eventually react in a strong way, due to his negative feelings having built up.  The 
offender, on the other hand, is likely to see this as an overreaction and not apologize, 
believing the victim to be overly sensitive.  Similarly, Exline and colleagues (2007) 
reported that victims were more likely to receive apologies if they confronted the 
transgressor in a way that was neither hostile nor vengeful. 
 Cohen (1999) also laid out some risks for apologizers.  In terms of benefits, 
Cohen noted that apologizing might help the transgressor “develop ‘internal strength’ and 
‘character’” (p. 7), but also opens the transgressor up to negative judgments.  
Specifically, Cohen suggested that apologizing might make one seem weak to observers, 
and noted further that it is the desire to avoid this that prevents some parties from 
apologizing. 
 Independent of others’ judgments, Cohen (1999) also suggested that apologizing 
might in some ways be damaging to an offender.  He observed that some people might 
consider apologizing to be a demeaning act, as it “requires humbling oneself before 
another and admitting a wrongdoing” (p. 7).  Further, if one does apologize but has her 
apology rejected, she may experience shame, resentment, or any other negative emotions.  
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Some people, then, might avoid offering apologies to save themselves from potential 
negative psychological effects. 
 Effects of Accounts on Views of Transgressors in the Legal System 
 Several authors have explored the effect of (perceived) remorse on impressions of 
wrongdoers, especially in legal situations.  Bornstein and his colleagues (2002), for 
example, found that participants judged a wrongdoer less negatively when he offered an 
apology than when he did not.  Further, expressing remorse improved views of a civil 
defendant.  Participants did not differentiate between a defendant who did not mention 
feeling remorse and a defendant who explicitly denied being remorseful.  Remorse, then, 
appears to play a central role in observations of offenders; if one does not appear 
remorseful, an apology or account will do little to improve his image.  In their research 
looking into perceptions of drunk drivers, Taylor and Kleinke (1992) reported similar 
results.  Specifically, participants rated drunk drivers as more responsible and sensitive 
when they expressed remorse rather than denied it.  In another study, Kleinke, Wallis, 
and Stalder (1992) reported that rapists who expressed remorse received less severe 
evaluations from participants. 
 Niedermeier and colleagues (1999; 2001) also examined the effects of remorse on 
impressions of defendants, but reported some negative effects of expressing remorse.  In 
one study (1999, Experiment 2), the authors noted interesting interactions between 
defendant status and expressions of remorse.  Consistent with previous research, the 
authors reported that expressing remorse improved views of a defendant, but only when 
he was of relatively low status (a medical resident).  When the defendant was of high 
status (a medical director) expressions of remorse actually led to more guilty verdicts 
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than when he expressed no remorse.  In another series of studies, Niedermeier et al. 
(2001, Study 2) found that when mock jurors deemed a law fair (as opposed to unfair), 
expressions of remorse actually led to rating the defendant as more guilty.  Referring to it 
as a “remorse guilt explanation,” the authors suggested that, because the law was “fair,” 
mock jurors viewed the expression of remorse as incriminating.  This result can help 
explain why people are often wary of offering an apology or expressing remorse; many 
feel to do so would open them to some type of sanction (e.g., legal). 
 Legal Safeguards for Apologies 
 Although apologies can have healing benefits, one of the biggest drawbacks to 
offering an apology is the fear that others will see it as an admission of fault or liability, 
leading to serious consequences, such as legal action (i.e., lawsuits).  If one bumps into 
someone on a crowded street and issues a hurried, “I’m sorry,” she will likely face no 
serious consequences of her apology.  A doctor who misdiagnoses a patient, however, 
leading to more health complications, might fear that a sincere “I’m sorry” will indicate 
negligence and hence liability.  Indeed, this is one of the reasons doctors frequently cite 
for failure to apologize.  According to Gallagher and colleagues (2003), doctors worry 
that such expressions will open them up to legal action from patients (or patients’ 
families).  Another insightful piece of research comes from Vincent and Young (1994).  
Although their research took place in the United Kingdom, which has a healthcare system 
different from that in the United States, the findings of their research might still shed 
some light on medical malpractice situations in the United States.  In a survey of people 
currently involved in medical malpractice litigation, Vincent and Young found that the 
majority of their respondents (90%) reported feeling angry about the incident.  
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Respondents also reported feelings of bitterness, betrayal, and humiliation.  The authors 
also found that, if there was an explanation, respondents felt largely dissatisfied, seeing 
the explanation as “unclear, inaccurate, and lacking information” (p. 4).  This coincides 
with what Gallagher et al. (2003) found.  In their sample, patients wanted full disclosure 
from their doctor.  It seems likely, then, that failure to disclose medical errors fully can 
lead to an increased probability of a lawsuit.  Similarly, in only 13% of Vincent and 
Young’s (1994) sample did the apologizer either fully or partially accept responsibility, 
and on only 15% of the occasions did the apologizer offer a full or partial apology.  
Considering that apologies necessarily involve accepting responsibility for the action and 
its consequences, doctors might find that their fears are not unfounded. 
 Vincent and Young (1994) identified four main reasons for litigation.  First, 
respondents reported that they wished to see staff held accountable for errors.  Second, 
respondents sought an explanation for what happened.  Third, respondents wanted to 
ensure that a similar transgression would not happen again in the future.  Finally, 
respondents reported that they wanted “compensation and an admission of negligence” 
(p. 4).  These reasons fall in line with the elements of an apology.  First, the actor and 
victim must recognize the harm.  Respondents might see the doctor as being held 
accountable if the doctor admits some responsibility, which is the second element of an 
apology.  Finally, the implication that a similar transgression will not happen in the future 
is another essential element of an apology.  It seems, then, that an apology could have a 
significant effect on a person’s desire to bring a lawsuit against a doctor (or hospital, 
clinic, and so forth).  An apology will satisfy most of the reasons people provided for 
beginning litigation (except for, perhaps, the need for compensation). 
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 In response to concern that apologizing will result in legal action, a number of 
states have taken steps to provide legal safeguards for a wrongdoer (especially a 
physician) who offers an apology.  According to McDonnell and Guenther (2008), as of 
March 31, 2008, 36 states (including the District of Columbia) provide some form of 
legal safeguard, eliminating or greatly restricting evidence allowed concerning the 
voluntary disclosure of medical errors by physicians.  Further, 28 of these 36 states’ 
“laws prevent the use of expressions of sympathy, regret and condolence against the 
physician in subsequent litigation” (p. 812), protecting physicians from not only 
apologizing, but offering another form of communication typically associated with 
apologizing (e.g., expressing regret).  (For comprehensive reviews, see Cohen, 2002; 
Ebert, 2008; Landsman, 2008; McDonnell & Guenther, 2008; Newfield, 2007). 
 One of the states pioneering this movement was Massachusetts which, in 1986, 
passed a law protecting “statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy 
or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person 
involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be 
inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action” (Massachusetts 
General Laws ch. 233, Section 23D).  This law came about after a state senator’s 
daughter was killed when the bike she was riding was struck by a car.  The father was 
upset that the driver offered no expression of sympathy or remorse for his action.  Upon 
learning that the driver feared the legal consequences of such an expression, the senator 
sought to have such statements protected (Taft, 2000).  Deemed “sympathy laws,” the 
purpose of these laws is to allow transgressors to offer some expression of sympathy or 
condolence without fear of legal retaliation (e.g., Newfield, 2007). 
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 Since Massachusetts’ adoption of this protectionist law, other states have 
followed suit.  The extent of their protection varies, however.  For example, California 
and Texas protect expressions of sympathy (e.g., “I’m sorry”), but fault-admitting 
apologies (e.g., “This is all my fault”) are admissible to establish liability (Cal. Evid. 
Code § 1160; Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 18.061).  Similarly, if an 
expression of benevolence contains a fault-admitting statement (“I’m sorry that I hurt 
you”), the fault-admitting portion of the statement is admissible (e.g., Fla. Stat. § 
90.4026).  In the examples listed, statements by anyone (including physicians) are 
protected. Ebert (2008) suggested that these expressions of sympathy do little to pacify 
patient complaints because, as a true apology necessarily contains an admission of 
blameworthiness, doctors are not offering true apologies, so their expressions of 
sympathy might not have healing effects. 
 Some states, however, protect even fault-admitting statements of sympathy.  
Colorado’s statute, for example, deals expressly with the health-care industry (Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 13-25-135 (2009); Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.082 (2003)). The relevant portion 
provides that care providers are protected in cases in which they apologize (including a 
full admission of fault) for an unanticipated outcome resulting from medical error.  Thus, 
a doctor can offer a full apology, including the necessary component of admitting fault, 
without fear that any part of his apology may later be used in evidence against him. 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) also deal with admissibility issues.  Rules 
408 and 801 are particularly relevant.  FRE 801 (d)(2), for example, allows statements of 
fault admission to be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.  An admission, 
according to the rule is, “the party’s own statement, in either an individual or 
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representative capacity.”  Therefore, any statement made outside of settlement 
negotiations or mediation can be used.  Such a rule is likely to affect most people’s 
decision to offer some statement of sympathy.  FRE 408 also affords protection, dictating 
that statements made during settlement negotiations are not admissible in order to prove 
liability.  A physician, for example, who offers an apology during negotiations, cannot 
have his apology used later at trial as evidence of his liability. 
 Apologies are not the only type of account receiving legal protection, however.  
The law recognizes justification as a means of receiving a reduced sentence or some kind 
of protection.  Justification, as discussed above, involves admission of an action and its 
relation to an adverse outcome, but the actor claims some circumstance made his action 
permissible and he therefore should not be held accountable for the outcome.  Self-
defense laws, for example, protect individuals from legal sanction for effectively 
violating the law.  For example, if I hit someone who is attacking me and break his nose, 
I have committed battery.  Because I can justify my action, however (i.e., defending 
myself), the legal ramifications I face will be less than if I offered no justification for my 
action.  According to Schopp (1993), “those who raise justification defenses contend that 
although they have engaged in conduct that fulfills the material elements of a criminal 
offense, circumstances render that conduct socially acceptable and perhaps even desirable 
and, thus, immune from punishment” (p. 1237-1238).  Schopp went on to note that 
justification defenses apply to anyone in the same situation:  Self-defense, for example, 
would apply to anyone who hit her attacker and broke his nose in order to prevent an 
imminent attack. 
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 Excuses, on the other hand, are more person-specific (Schopp, 1993).  As the 
discussion above established, excuses involve recognition of the connection between 
one’s action and its outcome, but seeks an outside cause for the outcome.  For example, 
Bobby might admit throwing the ball in the house and subsequently breaking Carol’s 
vase, but might claim that his dog, Tiger, bumped into him, causing his throw to go in an 
unintended direction.2  As Schopp (1993) argued, excuse would not extend to everyone in 
that situation; only Bobby can make the excuse of Tiger’s interference. 
Effects for Victims 
 Aside from benefits for transgressors, apologies can also prove beneficial for 
those on the receiving end.  Physically, apologies helped to lower blood pressure in 
victims with high trait hostility following a provocation (Anderson et al., 2006).  Lawler, 
Younger, Piferi, Jobe, Edmondson, and Jones (2005; see also McCullough, 2000; 
Witvliet, 2001; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001) similarly reported that 
forgiveness has positive physiological effects, such as reduced negative affect and stress.  
The majority of benefits, however, are not tangible.  Not only do apologies serve to save 
the face of the transgressor, they also help save the face of the victim (Gonzales et al., 
1990).  Accounts might not serve to wholly repair the victim’s face, but they do validate 
the victim’s feelings and interpretations of the harm-causing situation.  By offering an 
apology, for example, an offender is saying, “I have done something wrong.  You are 
right to feel what you are feeling. I value and respect you as a person.” 
 One major benefit to victims concerns the psychological effects apologies 
produce.  For example, when given the opportunity to voice their concerns over a 
procedurally unfair act, participants had more positive evaluations of the act, especially if 
                                                 
2
 My apologies to “The Brady Bunch” for taking liberties with its storyline. 
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the harmdoer (in this case an authority figure) apologized (DeCremer & Schouten, 2008; 
see also Goodwin & Ross, 1992).  When the authority figure showed respect, this effect 
became even more pronounced.  DeCremer and Schouten suggested that giving victims a 
voice after a transgression conveys respect.  Victims interpreted this act, coupled with an 
apology, as an indication that the authority figure was sincere in his apology and also that 
he had a genuine interest in the victims’ welfare, which increased victims’ belief about 
the amount of respect the other had for them.  Further, Sitkin and Bies (1993) noted that 
explanations (not limited to apology) convey respect to subordinates, especially when the 
explanation is not required.  According to the authors, an unrequired explanation 
communicates to the subordinate that he is important and deserves an explanation for 
another’s actions.  Petrucci (2002) echoed these sentiments, noting that crime victims 
often seek apologies, which have the potential to decrease anger and thereby reduce 
aggression.  By letting go of such negative feelings, victims are then able to move 
forward.  Not receiving an apology, on the other hand, often leaves victims with the 
feeling that no one has recognized their pain and suffering (Regehr & Gutheil, 2002). 
 Overall, participants indicate that they recognize the benefits of accepting 
apologies (Risen & Gilovich, 2007).  Further, participants have reported knowing that 
others would judge them more positively for accepting an offered apology.  Sometimes, 
however, participants do not accept proffered apologies.  Although relatively rare, this 
rejection can negatively affect their relationship with the transgressor (see discussion 
above), and can also negatively impact observers’ views of them.  Risen and Gilovich 
(2007; see also Bennett & Dewberry, 1994) researched what happened to impressions of 
victims when they rejected apologies.  Overall, the authors found that people judged 
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victims more harshly when they rejected apologies.  Interestingly, whether the apology 
was sincere or insincere did not matter; simply refusing an offered apology led to 
negative views of the victim.  Therefore, victims might accept apologies in order to save 
face in front of others. 
 Restorative Justice 
 Restorative justice offers one way to bring about a change to the victim-offender 
relationship.  Simply put, restorative justice seeks to return victims, their families, and 
those affected by a transgression, to their original state (Strickland, 2004).  Unlike 
traditional forms of punishment, however, restorative justice also focuses on helping 
offenders make amends for what they have done.  Kurki (2000, p. 265) outlined how 
restorative justice differs from the traditional criminal justice process.  First, restorative 
justice considers the crime in a broader context.  It does not focus solely on the people 
involved, but looks to the broader community for effects of the crime.  Second, because 
of this broader spectrum, more people become “empowered” in the process.  Finally, 
restorative justice concerns itself with how well the parties’ needs are met.  The concern 
is less with punitive measures and more with healing measures.  Additionally, Petrucci 
(2002) stated that restorative justice has important implications, such as conflict 
resolution and, more importantly, allowing the victim to be a more active participant in 
the criminal justice process. 
 The idea of restorative justice is not a new one.  For example, the Babylonian 
Code (c. 1700 B.C.), the Sumerian Code of UrNammu (c. 2060 B.C.), and the Roman 
Law of the Twelve Tables (449 B.C.) all had provisions for restitution to the victim from 
the offender.  (For a more complete discussion, see Bazemore, 1998, p. 772.)  Bazemore 
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went on to outline the benefits of restorative justice for the victim, such as “hope of 
restitution or other forms of reparation, information about the case, the opportunity to be 
heard, and the input into the case as well as expanded opportunities for involvement and 
influence” (p. 771).  Stubbs (2007) echoed these benefits, listing harm reparation as the 
main focus of restorative justice.  She went on to comment that, through restorative 
justice, victims have the opportunity to express themselves and gain some amount of 
control over the situation. Victims also play a role in the matter’s resolution, gaining 
more insight into the incident and into the offender’s motivation for her action. 
CHAPTER 5:  Variables Affecting Account Usefulness 
 One factor which can affect the impact of an apology is how complete the 
apology itself is.  Robbennolt (2003) examined the effects of different forms of apologies 
on participants’ views of a transgressor and their subsequent willingness to accept 
settlement offers.  In terms of impressions of the transgressor, Robbennolt found that, 
when offered a full apology (i.e., the transgressor accepted responsibility for the 
consequences of his action), participants had more positive views of the offender.  They 
believed him to be more regretful, more moral, and more likely to be cautious in the 
future.  Participants also believed the transgressor accepted more responsibility for his 
actions and judged his actions more favorably.  Full apologies also reduced victims’ 
feelings of anger and increased feelings of sympathy for the transgressor. 
 In terms of accepting settlements for their injuries, Robbennolt’s (2003) research 
provided evidence for the positive effects of full apologies.  She reported that participants 
were more willing to accept a settlement offer when it accompanied a full apology, and 
participants further indicated the settlement would be more reparative when it came with 
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a full apology.  In contrast, when participants received only a partial apology, they were 
less inclined to accept the offer; and they became unsure about what course of action to 
pursue.  These data suggest that if a full apology in itself is not sufficient to repair the 
damage to a relationship, it can make an offer of reparation more palatable to the victim. 
 Another factor influencing the effectiveness of various accounts is the trust 
relationship between the transgressor and the victim. Kim and colleagues (2004) reported 
that the type of trust existing between the transgressor and victim affects what type of 
account will be most effective.  In this instance, trust is a “psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability” (p. 104).  The results of their study showed that an 
apology was most effective at enhancing one’s image and rebuilding trust between the 
parties, but only when the harm caused was due to a “competence-based” violation, that 
is, a violation based on one’s ability.  If the harm was “integrity-based” (i.e., based on 
moral character), on the other hand, the researchers found that denial was actually the 
most effective means of rebuilding trust and improving one’s image. 
 The law also recognizes certain relationships – called fiduciary relationships – as 
relationships of trust.  A fiduciary relationship exists where one (e.g., a doctor) has a 
special obligation of loyalty, a responsibility to act in another’s (e.g., a patient) best 
interest.  Co-workers, for example, are not involved in fiduciary relationships; in the law, 
as a general rule, strangers have no moral or legal obligation to act in the best interest of 
another whom they do not know.  A doctor, however, is legally obligated to act in the 
best interest of his patient.  As Forell and Sortun (2009) stated, breaches of fiduciary duty 
greatly differ from more common competence-based breaches of trust.  They contended 
that an obligation of loyalty places the fiduciary relationship on a higher plane than other 
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relationships, because the fiduciary relationship is typically one-way (e.g., a doctor must 
act in his patient’s best interest, but the patient owes no such loyalty to his doctor) and 
involves a scenario in which one party is dependent on the other party.  This dependence 
reflects a significant power imbalance in the relationship.  When a harm occurs, 
therefore, the resulting imbalance might be greater than in a non-fiduciary relationship.  
Because of this delicate balance, fiduciaries might be less willing to apologize because of 
the possible legal consequences of breaching the fiduciary duty and also the personal 
implications.  A doctor who breaches her relationship with a patient, for example, might 
be unwilling to apologize because of her fear of legal retaliation but also because 
apologizing might mean admitting that the patient was wrong for having trusted the 
doctor with her care, which can negatively impact the doctor’s view of herself as well as 
others’ views of her competence, her reputation, and so forth. 
 Essential in rebuilding relationships is forgiveness.  The majority of research on 
forgiveness and apology indicates that an apology paves the way for forgiveness in a 
variety of relationships.  Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003) observed that people judge their 
friends more positively when they accept responsibility for some event, but acting 
defensively actually has a negative impact on forgiveness.  Leary et al. (1998) offered an 
explanation, arguing that people in close relationships have more invested in one another 
and therefore have more visceral reactions to transgressions from close others than from 
strangers.  Indeed, feeling accepted or rejected by the other highly correlated with how 
hurt the victim felt by the event.  When we feel rejected by a close other, the 
disassociation is more threatening and therefore more painful.  We might also forgive 
close others because of feelings of obligation and also feelings that we have invested so 
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much in the relationship that ruining it would not be worth it, so we forgive (Kelley, 
1998). 
 McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal (1997) noted that forgiveness is essential 
for relationship repair in romantic relationships.  As these authors noted, when people 
forgave their romantic partners, they became less interested in self-protective behaviors 
and instead sought relationship-constructive actions, even at a personal cost.  Similarly, 
Gunderson and Ferrari (2008) examined forgiveness in imaginary romantic relationships.  
They reported positive effects for apologies.  Specifically, subjects reported that, if a 
romantic partner offered an apology for cheating, it would take less time and would be 
easier to forgive the partner, further reporting that they would be more likely to remain in 
the relationship.  They further projected their positive feelings toward the future, 
indicating that they felt more hopeful about the future of the relationship.  This effect 
only emerged when the partner cheated one time.  However, when the partner had a 
history of cheating, the apology did little to affect forgiveness.  One interpretation is that, 
with repeated cheating, an apology loses its effectiveness because an essential element 
(i.e., promising to refrain from the harm-causing behavior in the future) is missing.  
Either it is not a part of the statement or it is implied but not realized. An habitual cheater 
has demonstrated that she will not refrain from this behavior, thus a crucial element is 
missing from the apology (even if the offender explicitly states her intention of avoiding 
this behavior, her record would indicate otherwise), which renders it ineffective.  Lending 
support to this supposition, Kremer and Stephens (1983) found evidence that mitigating 
accounts lose their effectiveness in the presence of subsequent provocations. 
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 Another factor which influences one’s willingness to accept an apology is the 
severity of the event and its consequences.  Bennett and Earwaker (1994), for example, 
found a strong relationship between anger and severity; apologies helped reduce anger, 
especially when an event’s consequences were not serious.  Fukuno and Ohbuchi (1998) 
similarly reported that mitigative accounts (i.e., apology and excuse) were more effective 
than assertive accounts (i.e., justification and denial), even in the face of severe harm.  
Similarly, Robbennolt (2003) reported that partial apologies were somewhat helpful 
when an injury was relatively minor but negatively impacted perceptions of the 
transgressor when the injury was severe.  Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989) reported that 
victims’ desire for an apology lessened as the harm became less severe. Severity also 
influences the punishments for the offender.  Taylor and Kleinke (1992) found, for 
instance, that participants levied more severe sanctions (e.g., fines, prison sentences) 
against drunk drivers when the harm was severe.  Interestingly, severity was the only 
manipulation which determined the fine and prison sentence.  Even though participants 
had less negative views of the driver when he expressed remorse, only severity predicted 
punitive responses. 
 Interestingly, the severity of an action’s consequences can determine what 
account one offers (Itoi et al., 1996; McLaughlin et al., 1983).  As Schlenker and Darby 
(1981) put it, “the severity of the predicament is directly related to both the use of the 
nonperfunctory apologies and the number of components employed in such apologies” 
(p. 275).  Overall, it appears the more serious the event or its consequences become, the 
more the victim seeks an apology and the more an offender feels the need to offer one.  
One reason for this might be that one views the actor as more responsible for the event as 
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the outcome becomes more severe (e.g., Schlenker & Darby, 1981; Walster, 1966).  
Schlenker and Darby (1981) noted that, when an event’s consequences are minimal, 
people offer perfunctory apologies, such as “Pardon me” or “I’m sorry.”  As 
consequences become more severe, however, people reported being more likely to offer 
more complete apologies and, as responsibility increased, people were also more willing 
to ask for forgiveness outright.  In general, as severity increased, so too did the offender’s 
likelihood of using a mitigative rather than an assertive account.  In the most severe 
conditions, transgressors favored apologies. 
 Timing also plays a role in apology acceptance.  Frequently people offer 
apologies immediately after they have realized their harmful act.  McPherson-Frantz and 
Benningson (2005), however, noted that this can be problematic, as apologizing too soon 
might place the victim in an uncomfortable role as she might not be ready for de-
escalation.  The authors hypothesized that later apologies would be most effective 
because the victim will have had a chance to express herself and feel heard.  And this is, 
in fact, what the authors found.  They reported that apologies offered after the victim had 
a chance to express concern and feel heard were more successful than apologies offered 
before expression and voice.  However, early apologies were still more effective than 
offering no apology at all. 
 Not all researchers advocate allowing time to lapse between a transgression and 
apology, however.  Kremer and Stephens (1983), for example, noted that people are more 
likely to retaliate as the gap between the provocation and mitigation lengthens.  Lazare 
(2006) agreed, recommending that doctors apologize as soon as they become aware of a 
medical error.  As he observed, when people are aware of a delay between a harmful 
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event and apology, they view the delay as disrespectful or deceitful.  As mentioned 
above, respect plays a key role in rebuilding relationships.  Anything that destroys 
respect, then, might make the apology less effective.  In an empirical study of timing, 
Bornstein et al. (2002) reported that plaintiffs received greater compensation when a 
physician expressed remorse at the time of the error and again at trial.  Interestingly no 
difference in compensation emerged when the doctor expressed remorse at the trial 
versus when he expressed no remorse at all. 
 While it is clear from the literature on apologies that they can have healing 
effects, some people remain guarded when receiving an apology.  One reason people 
might be reluctant to accept an apology has to do with the transgressor’s (perceived) 
motivation for apologizing.  A criminal on trial, for example, might apologize to the 
victim’s family in order to receive a reduced sentence from a judge (Petrucci, 2002; 
Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986).  Generally, as discussed above, people also offer apologies 
to present themselves in a positive light or restore their self-image.  Indeed, Gonzales et 
al. (1990, p. 618) proposed that “accounts are typically conceived as ‘self-serving’ 
impression management vehicles for controlling the inferences and subsequent evaluative 
and affective responses of parties witness to or harmed by a social transgression.”  What 
are people’s reactions to apologies when they believe the transgressor is only apologizing 
to gain some benefit for him- or herself? 
 Kim and colleagues (2004) suggested that a person’s perceived integrity weighs 
heavily on the attributions one will make of him.  According to the authors, people 
assume that people of perceived high integrity will not act inappropriately in any 
situation.  People with perceived low integrity, on the other hand, “may exhibit either 
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dishonest or honest behaviors depending on their incentives and opportunities” (p. 106).  
The authors went on to note, further, that a single honest behavior does not prove 
particularly diagnostic, but a single dishonest behavior indicates someone with low 
integrity, as a person with high integrity would not engage in any dishonest behavior.  
Similarly, in their research on persuasion, Weiner and Mowen (1986) found that when 
people suspected a source of harboring ulterior motives (in this case trying to sell an 
automobile), subjects generally devalued that product (e.g., they considered the 
automobile to be of lower value). 
 Cases of defendants (civil or criminal) may certainly fit the credentials outlined 
above; simply being a defendant may lend itself to general mistrust, especially with jurors 
harboring proprosecution biases (e.g., Wrightsman, 1987).  Thus, if a defendant makes an 
apology in court, it follows that people will be skeptical of the message and messenger.  
Indeed, Lazare (2006) noted that in many cases, apologies have no impact because of 
their “fraudulence, insincerity, or disingenuousness” (p. 1403).  Weiner and colleagues 
(1991) found that when one confesses after an accusation, observers tended to attribute 
this to mere impression management, and it is therefore not wholly beneficial to the 
transgressor. 
 In their review of American and Japanese law regarding apology in a legal 
context, Wagatsuma and Rosett (1986) noted that American courts (both civil and 
criminal) do not require any expression of remorse or regret from defendants, unlike their 
Japanese counterparts.  The authors further noted that requiring some form of apology 
would likely make the act seem insincere and forced, which might make victims less 
willing to accept the apology (see also, Cohen, 1999; Exline et al., 2007).  Further, 
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Skarlicki, Folger, and Gee (2004) reported that when participants perceived a partner’s 
social account as a manipulative tactic, it lost effectiveness.  As participants saw their 
partners as using social accounts in a more manipulative way, they held less positive 
views of them and had more negative reactions to their partners. 
 Questionable motives do not always an insincere apology make, however.  Risen 
and Gilovich (2007) conducted research examining the effects of spontaneous and 
coerced apologies.  They found that wronged parties had consistent reactions to 
spontaneous and coerced apologies.  In both conditions, targets liked the transgressor the 
same amount and thought he should be paid the same amount for his efforts in a task.  
Observers, on the other hand--that is, people watching the victim/transgressor interaction 
but having no direct involvement--did rate the transgressor differently depending on the 
type of apology offered.  When the transgressor offered a spontaneous apology, observers 
liked him significantly more than when he offered a coerced apology.  Further, observers 
suggested paying the harmdoer who offered a spontaneous apology 14% more.  Offering 
a coerced apology decreased the transgressor’s likeability and also led to impressions that 
he experienced less remorse for the harm caused.  Interestingly, when there was no 
apology present, observers had more positive ratings of the transgressor and wanted to 
pay him more than when he offered a coerced apology.  In terms of observers’ 
judgments, even when the harm was made salient, offering no apology was more 
beneficial to the harmdoer than was offering a coerced apology.  As Risen and Gilovich 
put it, “the coerced apology was worse than no apology, and the failure to offer an 
apology seemed to work as well as offering a spontaneous apology” (p. 424).  Thus, 
while those directly involved with an offense might respond positively to offenders who 
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apologize, regardless of motivation, the court of public opinion might not be so forgiving.  
One potential explanation for this distinction has to do with norms (discussed above); 
victims likely face norms to accept apologies that observers do not.  Another possibility 
is that observers see the transgressor as ingratiating, which works more effectively on 
actors than bystanders, probably because actors (as opposed to observers) are motivated 
to accept others’ positive reactions (e.g., compliments) toward them (Jones & Pittman, 
1982). 
 Another possibility, however, is that victims and observers might view offenders 
who willingly apologize in a public forum (such as a courtroom) as more sincere, because 
of the very setting in which they offer the apology.  Instead of offering an apology to the 
victim him/herself, by acknowledging one’s misconduct and accepting responsibility in a 
public place, an offender might be conveying an impression of one who is truly sorry and 
willing to admit fault.  As evidence of this, Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989) found that 
participants rated research assistants as more responsible when the assistant apologized in 
front of the experimenter than when she apologized to the victim alone.  The authors 
suggested that perceivers viewed the research assistant as acting in a personally costly 
way, which, perhaps, increased her credibility.  Thus, an apology offered publicly, while 
viewed suspiciously by some, might have more positive effects for the offender than an 
apology offered privately.  Also, offenders who apologize publicly might convey a 
deeper sense of shame for their wrongdoing. 
Determining an Apology’s Sincerity  
 Apologies and remorse abound in criminal justice settings (Niedermeier, 
Horowitz, & Kerr, 1999, 2001) – defendants are especially likely to use them, either 
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sincerely or instrumentally, to get more lenient sentences.  According to Bibas and 
Bierschbach (2004, p. 94), expressions of remorse “indicate that an offender is not ‘lost,’ 
that he has some self-transformative capacity that justifies (or requires) a lesser 
punishment.”  The United States Sentencing Commission even contains provisions for 
the expression of remorse (1994, p. 72-73).  And Petrucci (2002) explained that apologies 
can help establish either “acceptance of responsibility” or “mitigating circumstances;” 
either of which can result in a reduced sentence.  Accepting responsibility, according to 
Petrucci’s (2002) review, can have a large effect on sentence reduction.  Specifically, she 
noted that early admissions of guilt and cooperation with officials are major determinants 
in sentence reduction.  One aspect of a defendant’s apology involves admission of guilt, 
without which there is no “acceptance of responsibility” and therefore no sentence 
reduction (U.S. v. Williams, 1991).  (For a more complete review of case law, see 
Petrucci, 2002.) 
 Given the motivation for offenders to lie, how does one judge a true apology from 
an untrue apology?  The following section will delve into research in the area of 
deception detection.  A distinction is warranted, however.  The research on apology 
above dealt with sincerity, while the research regarding deception detection deals with 
believability.  Although the two concepts may be related, they are distinct. An account 
may be both sincere and believable, since the two are not mutually exclusive:  But an 
account may be sincere without being believed, or may be believed without being 
sincere.  According to the literature (e.g., Moran, 2005), sincerity resides within the 
individual.  When one internalizes his feelings and attempts to express them, he is said to 
be sincere.  A defendant, then, may truly feel badly for his actions and internalize his 
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negative emotions (e.g., guilt).  The negative feelings generated by his guilt might then 
lead to feelings of remorse, which he might try to express to another party (e.g., the 
victim, the court).  Believability, on the other hand, focuses more on the observer’s 
perception of the transgressor’s statement.  Because the observer cannot see into the 
transgressor’s mind, it is entirely possible for a transgressor to be completely sincere in 
his apology but not have it believed.  As Moran (2005, p. 342) put it, “We value sincerity 
in speech … because it is the closest we can come to unmediated access to the genuine 
state of mind of the person with whom we are communicating.”  He continued, 
[S]incerity matters to speech because its presence is our guarantee that 
what the speaker says is an accurate representation of what he actually 
believes.  If what we hear from a speaker is to be believable, it is because 
the speech we hear provides us with access to what the speaker’s own 
beliefs are, and his statements will be believable only to the extent that we 
are counting on his beliefs on this matter to be reliable. (italics in original) 
 
The opposite is also possible:  A transgressor may offer an entirely insincere 
statement, but the observer may believe its veracity.  Research in the realm of apologies 
and accounts, however, has focused on the apologizer’s (perceived) sincerity and not 
believability. 
 Kraut (1978) identified two types of information available to determine deception.  
He suggested people look at performance cues, in which “the audience perceives that an 
actor has failed to adequately control some aspect of his deceptive performance” (p. 389).  
He also suggested that people consider the actor’s motivational cues, which arise in 
situations apart from the actor’s performance.  These motivation cues “provide standards 
against which a performance is judged” (p. 390).  A job interview, for example, involves 
self-presentation.  An audience, therefore, would judge the actor’s self-presentation in 
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that situation against their standard for self-presentation in a job interview to determine if 
deception was likely to have occurred.  Seiter, Bruschke, and Bai (2002) commented that 
a deceiver’s motivation for lying is the most important factor in determining the lie’s 
acceptability.  Not surprisingly, the more the deception is intended to benefit someone 
other than the liar, the more people report the deception as acceptable.  Interestingly, the 
selfishness or selflessness of an offender’s apology does not seem to affect a recipient’s 
willingness to accept it.  As Hareli and Eisikovits (2006) reported, whether guilt or shame 
motivated an offender’s apology, recipients were equally likely to forgive. 
 Kashy and DePaulo (1996) commented that “publicly self-conscious” individuals 
lied more.  A defendant, one likely made “publicly self-conscious,” then might find 
herself more predisposed to lie than tell the truth.  The authors further noted that, “people 
tell lies to accomplish the most basic social interaction goals, such as influencing others, 
managing impressions, and providing reassurance and support” (p. 1037), and research 
on lying indicates that it factors heavily into daily life (e.g., Kashy & DePaulo, 1996).  
DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996), for example, had participants 
keep diaries of how often they told lies in their everyday interactions.  Among their 
sample of community members, the researchers found that people reported lying about 
once per day; college students averaged two lies per day.  Moreover, the researchers 
found that the overwhelming majority of lies told (more than 80%) were at least partially 
about the liar him- or herself (e.g., about one’s own feelings, thoughts, opinions).  
Furthermore, people reported lying based on self-serving motives, especially if the 
benefit of the lie would be psychic (rather than materialistic).  The results indicated that 
people were about twice as likely to tell a self-serving lie as one intended to benefit other 
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people.  Finally, participants reported that, when lying, they expected others to believe 
their lies.  And, in fact, Elaad (2003) reported that people are better able to conceal than 
detect lies. 
 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a case addressing 
constitutional protection under the First Amendment’s Free Speech clause for lying 
(United States v. Alvarez).  The Stolen Valor Act (18 U.S.C. § 704(b)) prohibits an 
individual from “falsely represent[ing] himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have 
been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of 
the United States…”.  In January 2012 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
Act, acknowledging that “false statements of fact do not enjoy constitutional protection, 
except to the extent necessary to protect more valuable speech” (United States v. 
Strandlof, 2012, p. 3).  Noting that upholding the Stolen Valor Act did nothing to 
“impinge or chill protected speech” (p. 3) the Tenth Circuit argued the act did not violate 
the First Amendment.  In a different case the Ninth Circuit struck down the Act, noting 
that the Act must pass strict scrutiny, which, the Ninth Circuit opined, the Stolen Valor 
Act does not.  These conflicting holdings led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in 
Alvarez, in which they will, essentially, determine the constitutionality of lying, at least 
about certain subjects. 
 Social skills can also affect the frequency with which people lie.  Kashy and 
DePaulo (1996) reported that people with greater social skills lied significantly more than 
did people with less developed social skills.  Further, in their sample of college students, 
social skills significantly predicted everyday lying. 
57 
 
 Overall, how do people do when trying to detect lying?  The majority of the 
evidence indicates that people are poor lie detectors.  DePaulo and Pfeifer (1986) 
provided insight into lie detection by comparing an undergraduate sample with a sample 
of newly recruited federal law enforcement trainees and a sample of advanced law 
enforcement officers.  No differences emerged between the samples; those with more 
“experience” at lie detection performed at the same rate as the undergraduate sample.  
Also, they showed no indication that they would be more adept at developing lie 
detection skills than the undergraduate sample.  However, Elaad (2003) reported that 
overall, law-enforcement officers, acting as judges, reported that they would be more 
likely to accurately detect lies than would “non-experts.”  In another comparison, Ekman 
and O’Sullivan (1991) noted that those working for the Secret Service did outperform 
other samples in detecting deception, but the rate of success was still quite low.  The 
Secret Service averaged 64% correct deception detection, while the next closest group, 
federal polygraphers, averaged approximately 56%.  Indeed, Sporer and Schwandt (2007) 
noted that various groups (e.g., police officers, legal professionals, students) all held 
similar (and possibly erroneous) assumptions about what nonverbal behaviors indicated 
deception. 
 Overall, in their research on deception detection, Millar and Millar (1997) 
observed that people believed deception was most likely when the deceiver would have a 
high gain from the deception, the chance of detection was low, and the cost of deception 
was low.  Conversely, in situations in which the gain was low, but the chance of detection 
and cost of deception were high, people were least likely to believe deception would 
occur. 
58 
 
Indicators of Deception 
When detecting deception, people use different types of verbal and nonverbal cues to aid 
them (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991).  As Frank (2005, p. 341) put it, “because a lie 
involves a deliberate, conscious behavior, we can speculate that this effort may leave 
some trace, sign, or signal that may betray that lie.”  In his chapter, Frank (2005, p. 342-
343) identified a number of levels at which researchers have attempted to study 
nonverbal behavior.  He recognized physical components, which include body 
movements (e.g., arms, hands, torso), eyeblinks, pupil dilation, number of pauses, 
response latency, and so forth.  Next, Frank discussed the psychologic meaning level, 
which often involve the physical components listed above, but also include adaptors (e.g., 
touching one’s face), illustrators (“which accompany speech to help keep the rhythm of 
the speech, emphasize a word, show direction of thought, etc.”), emblems (e.g., nodding 
one’s head to indicate agreement), facial expression, speech rate and speech errors.  
Additionally, Sporer and Schwandt (2007) identified two classes of nonverbal behavior:  
nonverbal visual cues and paraverbal cues.  According to the authors, nonverbal visual 
cues encompass such things as facial expression and bodily movements, whereas 
paraverbal cues include things such as pitch and speech errors.3 
The following paragraphs describe common cues associated with deception.  It 
should be noted, however, that what people use as cues to deception do not necessarily 
coincide with the actual behaviors which can accompany deception (e.g., The Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).  The descriptions given 
below reflect examples of what people believe to be associated with deception.  With the 
                                                 
3
 I have adopted Sporer and Schwandt’s (2007) classification system to organize the following 
subsections.  However, when describing studies I will use the terms employed by the authors. 
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exception of certain body movements (i.e., nodding, foot and leg movement, hand/finger 
movements), none of the “traditional deception cues” (e.g., eye contact) people employ 
are reliable indicators of deception (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). 
Paraverbal Cues 
 One hypothesis is that when the speaker’s emotion runs high (e.g., in “high 
stakes” situations), people should be more accurate at detecting deception (Ekman, 
O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991; Frank & Ekman, 1997).  In an early study on lie 
detection, Apple, Streeter, and Krauss (1979) reported that voice pitch can affect one’s 
perceived honesty and persuasiveness; the higher the voice, the less honest and 
persuasive the speaker is perceived to be. 4   The authors suggested that a high-pitched 
voice indicated stress, leading many observers to conclude that the speaker was lying.  
The authors also noted that, with “loaded questions,” people are somewhat more 
forgiving of higher-pitched voices than when the question involves something more 
mundane. In other words, high-pitched voices, overall, indicated deception; in the 
presence of a “loaded question” “raters were willing to call both low- and normal-pitched 
voices more truthful than high-pitched voices” (p. 720).  On topics that are uninvolved, 
however, people were only more willing to believe someone with a low-pitched voice.  
Indeed, in its research, The Global Deception Research Team (2006), using data from 58 
countries, reported that, cross-culturally, a speaker’s nervousness indicated deception. 
 Frank and Ekman (1997) took research on arousal one step further.  Whereas 
Apple and colleagues (1979) had participants listen to voice recordings, Frank and 
Ekman (1997) had people visually observe speakers and determine whether the speakers 
were engaged in deception.  Participants in Frank and Ekman’s study, then, could use 
                                                 
4
 These results are all based on ratings of men’s voices. 
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different sources as a means of determining deception.  While Frank and Ekman reported 
that emotion plays a role in deception detection, their results indicated that judges relied 
more on what the authors referred to as nonverbal behavior (e.g., facial expressions) to 
diagnose more aroused liars.  Judges judged liars who were not aroused based on verbal 
behavior.  The researchers considered motivated liars to be the most aroused.  Therefore, 
when judging an offender’s truthfulness, one can look to motivation and arousal as 
indicators of whether one should pay attention to verbal or nonverbal cues.  According to 
Frank and Ekman, the “first step in the process is to recognize a sign, a clue, a behavior 
that violates expectations, or an emotion displayed by a target person that is at odds with 
his or her verbal line” (p. 1437).  Observers need to view this cautiously, however.  As 
Petrucci (2002) noted, “offenders who genuinely apologize but who use a different 
language style than the observer may be more likely to be seen as unconvincing” (p. 
346).  In other words, it does not necessarily indicate deception that one’s style violates 
expectation. 
 Pace was an additional factor in determining truthfulness.  Apple and colleagues 
(1979; Hocking & Leathers, 1980) reported that slow- and fast-paced speech indicated 
deceptiveness, while moderately-paced speech was most indicative of honesty. 
 Nonverbal Visual Cues 
 Worldwide, people cite gaze aversion as the most telltale sign that someone is 
being untruthful (The Global Deception Research Team, 2006; see also Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2007).  Research (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007), 
however, does not bear this out; eye contact (or lack thereof) is not a faithful indicator of 
deception. 
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 Hocking and Leathers (1980) reported that deceivers should use “fewer gestural 
cues such as foot movements, head movements, and illustrators” (p. 130).  Sporer and 
Schwandt (2007), in their meta-analysis of nonverbal indicators of deception, reported 
fewer behaviors such as nodding, foot, leg, and hand movements when someone was 
lying. 
 Verbal and Nonverbal Indicators of Deception 
 Unfortunately, no one factor seems to be present across all attempts at deception, 
although some, on aggregate, can predict deception, particularly if the liar is motivated 
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003).  As Frank (2005) 
suggested, one possible reason for this is the failure of researchers to fully define what 
their concepts are.  He noted that often, inter-rater reliability is quite high as to what 
constitutes a smile (above 0.90), but researchers never clearly establish what constitutes a 
smile.  Similarly, researchers have conceptualized things like ‘arousal’ quite differently, 
which may be one reason results are sometimes anomalous. 
 Nonverbal cues, however, are no surefire way to detect deception.  Instead, some 
(e.g., Ekman et al., 1991) suggested that nonverbal cues such as facial expression should 
encourage investigators to delve more deeply into a particular area of inquiry, rather than 
to take such nonverbal cues as proof of deception.  Indeed, Sporer and Schwandt’s (2007) 
meta-analysis revealed that nodding, and foot, leg, and hand movements all decreased 
with deception, which was counter to lay beliefs about cues to deception. 
CHAPTER 6:  Apologies and Deception:  Bridging the Gap 
 As the previous sections illustrate, a great deal of literature focuses on apologies 
and deception detection.  The relationship between these two areas, however, is 
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underdeveloped.  One fundamental area of research concerns distinguishing between 
believability and sincerity.  While a majority of research focuses on the sincerity of the 
apology, the concept of sincerity remains unclear.  Similarly, the research examining 
believability does little to clarify how participants define/understand this concept.  A 
potential explanation for this has to do with the procedure of the apology studies.  They 
all involve paper-and-pencil methods, which do not easily lend themselves to the study of 
deception.  For example, there are often no overt indications that an apologizer is 
insincere or not believable in his delivery.  Although researchers have manipulated 
circumstances which might influence an apologizer’s motivation (e.g., a criminal 
apologizing in court to receive a lighter sentence), participants have had to rely on written 
descriptions to determine sincerity.  Considering the verbal and nonverbal dynamics 
involved with deception detection, it is not surprising that the relevant apology research 
does not address this issue.  One avenue ready for exploration, then, involves having 
participants rate apologies based on live experiences rather than written vignettes. 
 Another beneficial avenue to explore involves the apologizer’s motivation for 
offering the apology.  Watching a criminal offer an apology in court, for example, might 
lead to different attributions than simply reading about it.  The interaction between what 
the offender says and his/her body language and voice inflections could have interesting 
implications.  For example, even though research (e.g., Taylor & Kleinke, 1992) has 
indicated that people view offenders who apologize more favorably, if one sees an 
offender apologize in a purely perfunctory manner, the observer may be more skeptical of 
the apology and judge the offender (and the proffered apology) more negatively than if 
there was no apology. 
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 Finally, a variety of factors can influence one’s interpretation of another’s 
nonverbal and verbal behavior.  For example, one might be more critical and observant of 
an apologizer’s nonverbal and verbal behavior when he has high motivation to apologize 
(e.g., a criminal in court) as opposed to a low motivation (e.g., bumping into someone).  
Cues indicating deception might be more apparent and influence subsequent 
interpretations of one’s apology. 
 The study of apology is an important aspect of understanding relational dynamics 
across a variety of settings.  Apologies stand apart from other accounts such as excuses 
and justifications in that they include accountability for conduct without any attempt at 
mitigating the conduct’s outcome or at justifying one’s action.  From everyday 
transgressions to major crimes, apologies can have healing effects for victims as well as 
offenders.  These effects, however, are far from straightforward.  Indeed, the evident 
culpability of the actor, the timing of the apology and its completeness can all impact 
how willing one is to accept it.  Similarly, an offender’s motivation for offering an 
apology can affect its perceived genuineness. 
 In terms of an apology’s authenticity, it is important to understand that people 
offer apologies and accounts for a number of reasons.  Mending relationships, saving 
face, and receiving more lenient punishments are all reasons people might offer 
apologies.  Conversely, people resist apologizing in a number of situations in order to 
avoid admitting culpability.  In response to such concerns, a number of legal safeguards 
are in place (to varying degrees) to protect transgressors and their statements. 
 Due to the effects apologies can have, however (e.g., reduced prison sentence), it 
becomes important for victims and observers to determine when one is being forthcoming 
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or deceptive.  Research in this realm, however, is not terribly promising, as it reveals that 
people are very fallible lie detectors overall. 
CHAPTER 7:  Current Research 
 I conducted a study examining the effects of verbal and non-verbal behavior on 
perceptions of believability and sincerity.  Although previous research has assessed 
sincerity, none has gone beyond asking participants, “How sincere did the apologizer 
seem?” without defining sincerity.  Indeed, it appears that most research has used 
sincerity and believability synonymously.  It is an important issue to clarify, then, as the 
two, although at times linked, can exist without each other.  As mentioned above, 
sincerity does not necessarily mean that one will be believed, and believing another’s 
statement does not mean that statement was sincere.  Given the implications an apology 
can have, it is important to recognize what factors lend themselves to believability and 
sincerity detection, especially with respect to nonverbal behavior (i.e., nonverbal visual 
cues and paraverbal cues), relationship between the parties, and type of statement. 
 The research involved a medical malpractice case involving a misdiagnosis of 
appendicitis.  Participants read the facts of a medical malpractice case before watching a 
videotaped statement from the physician-defendant.  The videotaped statement allowed 
participants to observe eye contact as well as variations in speech rate.  This study is the 
first to incorporate facets of nonverbal behavior in judging responses to transgressions. 
Hypotheses 
 Nonverbal Behavior 
 As reviewed above, when assessing a speaker’s message, people rely on the 
content of the communication, but they also rely on how the speaker relays the content.  
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A speaker’s posture, mannerisms, and body language can all influence perceptions of a 
message.  One aspect of nonverbal behavior people routinely observe is eye contact.  As 
Sporer and Schwandt (2007, p. 1) noted, “around the world gaze aversion is deemed the 
most important signal of deception.”  Indeed, the Global Deception Research Team 
(2006), in their survey of men and women from 58 countries around the world, including 
western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as eastern 
countries such as Japan and China, found that “the most common belief about deception 
worldwide is that liars avoid eye contact” (p. 65).  These authors further noted that, when 
lying about facts and feelings (as opposed to simply facts), liars made less eye contact.  
The effects of eye contact on believability have implications for lie detection, in that 
people believe liars make eye contact less frequently and hold a gaze for a shorter period 
of time than do truthtellers, although research does not support this assumption (e.g., 
Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). 
 Another aspect of nonverbal behavior involves speech rate.  The underlying 
assumption is that liars are affected by adrenaline (presumably from fear of being caught 
in a lie) and therefore speak at faster rates than usual (for a review see Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2007).  Similarly, Guerrero and Floyd (2006, p. 179) noted that “one’s vocal 
pattern and fluency might be compromised by the increased anxiety and arousal that 
often accompanies deception…”  Further, in their review, Guerrero and Floyd cited 
research indicating that a speaker’s increased nervousness heightened listeners’ suspicion 
that the speaker might be attempting deception. 
 Speech rate also affects perceptions of relationships.  Newton and Burgoon 
(1990), for example, found that partners in relationships spoke more quickly in conflict 
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situations.  These “competing strategies” might indicate to observers tension and conflict 
in a relationship, resulting in harsher judgments of a defendant.  Sillars (1980), for 
example, noted that partners use competing strategies when they blame their partner; in 
the current study observers might infer the faster speech rate indicates guilt on the part of 
the physician-defendant. 
 It is worth noting, however, that a more rapid speech rate can positively affect a 
speaker’s credibility in certain situations.  Miller, Maruyama, and Beaber (1976), for 
example, reported that speakers who spoke more quickly were more persuasive.  Buller 
and Aune (1992) also reported positive effects for speech rate; the more the speaker’s 
speech rate matched that of the participant, the more the participant liked the speaker and 
the more the participant was willing to comply with the speaker’s request.  These results, 
however, do not directly address deception.  Indeed, Miller and colleagues (1976, p. 621) 
noted “in no way can we claim that our effects are entirely or purely attributable to speed 
of speech.” 
The effects of eye contact and speech rate (discussed above) led to my first two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1:  I expected a main effect for eye contact.  Specifically, the less direct eye 
contact the defendant maintains, the lower the ratings for believability and (perceived) 
sincerity.  I also predicted less eye contact would lead to less positive perceptions of the 
defendant as measured by how satisfied participants were with his statement, how 
compassionate they felt him to be, and whether or not they agreed with the liability 
judgment.  Additionally, they will award higher compensatory damages when there is 
less direct eye contact. 
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Hypothesis 2:  I expected a main effect for speech rate.  Specifically, the more quickly 
the defendant speaks, the less believable and sincere participants will rate his statement.  I 
also predicted that a faster speech rate would lead to less positive perceptions of the 
defendant as measured by how satisfied participants were with his statement, how 
compassionate they felt him to be, and whether or not they agreed with the liability 
judgment.  Additionally, they will award higher compensatory damages when the 
plaintiff speaks more quickly. 
 Familiarity 
 Another manipulation included in this study involves the familiarity between the 
parties. In the “familiar” condition George Thompson (the plaintiff) had visited Dr. 
Johnson (the defendant) approximately eight times over five years for relatively minor 
issues (e.g., colds and allergies).  In the “unfamiliar” condition George Thompson and 
Dr. Johnson had no prior relationship. 
Itoi et al. (1996) reported that, when assuming the role of a transgressor, 
American participants chose which type of account to offer based on concerns regarding 
them as individuals, rather than concerns regarding their relationship with the victim, 
regardless of whether the victim was known to them or not.  In this research, however, I 
expected an effect of relationship closeness.  The reason for this lies in the relationship 
which this study will establish:  that between a doctor and patient (Thimsen, Bornstein, & 
Robbennolt, 2007).  Itoi and colleagues (1996) asked participants to imagine themselves 
as transgressors in a variety of situations.  To establish relationship closeness, the 
researchers stated that the victim in each case was either a complete stranger to the 
transgressor (i.e., participant) or was a close friend.  In the present research, I used the 
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doctor-patient relationship because it contains a type of trust different from that in 
friendship.  While it is not unrealistic to think doctors are friends with their patients, by 
virtue of their profession they have explicit obligations to treat their patients (friends or 
not) in a certain way.  If they fail in this duty they may face ramifications (e.g., legal, 
professional).  Friendship, on the other hand, (typically) comes with no explicit 
obligations; there are no standards of practice.  While one may feel betrayed, hurt, let 
down, and so forth, by a friend, it is unlikely the friend would face any legal or 
professional ramifications for his actions.  In terms of trust, it might be that people feel 
more let down by doctors when the trust is violated because there are specific 
expectations established for physicians’ behavior. 
Hypothesis 3:  I predicted a main effect for familiarity.  Specifically, I predicted 
participants would award lower compensatory damage awards when a previous 
relationship existed than when the parties had no previous relationship.  I also predicted 
participants would rate the statement as less sincere and believable when no previous 
relationship existed. 
 Trust Variables 
 In the current research, I also assessed participants’ levels of dispositional trust as 
third parties; they are not directly involved in the harm.  Examining participants’ levels of 
trust is important for two main reasons.  First, people vary in their general levels of trust, 
which can affect responses to trust violations, those in which they are directly involved, 
but also, possibly, trust violations they witness in other relationships.  Second, looking at 
relationships in terms of legal obligations might elicit different responses from 
participants.  Establishing a prior relationship between the two individuals adds a level of 
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interpersonal trust, in addition to the general trust most people place in physicians.  I 
included three different measures of trust:  the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967), 
Faith in People Scale (Rosenberg, 1957), and a subset of items from the International 
Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999). 
Hypothesis 4:  I hypothesized that participants scoring higher on trust would find the 
plaintiff as less justified in suing the defendant. 
 Statement Type 
 Participants will view one of two statements.  One includes an explicit apology 
along with elements of excuse, while the other only includes the doctor’s excuse for his 
behavior with no element of an apology (e.g., saying “I’m sorry” or acknowledging 
wrongdoing).  Exploring different statements from the doctor will add to the literature 
examining the different effects of apologies and excuses. 
Hypothesis 5:  I predicted a main effect for statement type:  participants will have more 
positive perceptions of the defendant when he offers an apology than when he does not.  
Additionally, participants will award less in compensatory damages when the defendant 
apologizes.  To assess perceptions I used three ratings:  satisfaction with the defendant’s 
explanation, how compassionate they believed the defendant to be, and whether they 
agreed with the liability verdict.  Additionally, I predicted that participants would award 
less in compensatory damages when the defendant apologizes. 
 Interactions 
 In addition to main effects, I predicted some interactions among independent 
variables. 
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Hypothesis 6:  I predicted an interaction between eye contact and statement type.  
Previous research (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; The Global Deception Research Team, 
2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007) has established that people use eye contact as an (albeit 
faulty) cue of deception.  Maintaining eye contact, then, might indicate to participants 
that the doctor is being forthcoming with his apology.  Similarly, by offering an apology, 
participants might form a more positive view of the doctor.  Taken together, these 
conclusions led me to hypothesize that participants will have more positive perceptions of 
Dr. Johnson when he maintains eye contact and apologizes than when he offers an excuse 
only.  To assess perceptions I used the same variables as in Hypothesis 5 (i.e., 
explanation satisfaction, perceived compassion, and agreement with verdict).  I also 
hypothesized that maintaining eye contact and an apology will result in the lowest 
compensatory damage awards and maintaining eye contact and an excuse will result in 
the highest compensatory damage awards.  I also hypothesized that maintaining eye 
contact without an apology will result in less positive perceptions of the defendant and 
higher compensatory damage awards; participants might see an excuse with direct eye 
contact as a sign of defiance rather than a sign of contrition. 
Hypothesis 7:  According to Kim et al. (2004), participants reported greater trust 
reparation when a transgressor offered an apology for a competence-based trust violation.  
I therefore predicted an interaction between statement type and familiarity.  Specifically, 
I hypothesized that compensatory damages will be lowest when the doctor apologizes and 
a prior relationship exists between the parties.  I expected the highest damage awards to 
occur when the doctor offers an excuse and has a prior relationship with the plaintiff; 
statement type will have less of an effect in the absence of a prior relationship. 
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Relationship between Believability and Perceived Sincerity 
 As mentioned above, a number of studies have examined perceptions of 
believability and sincerity, but have not gone beyond asking participants simple yes/no 
questions or rating questions.  Thus, in my research, questions regarding sincerity and 
believability will be largely exploratory. 
Hypothesis 8:  I hypothesized that believability and sincerity ratings will positively 
correlate with each other.  Content analyses from open-ended questions revealed what 
factors affected participants’ judgments of the believability and sincerity of the 
defendant’s statement.  Although I did not hypothesize differences between ratings of 
sincerity and believability, analyses will be able to determine whether the independent 
variables affect sincerity and believability differently. 
CHAPTER 8:  Method 
Participants 
 Participants (N = 297) came from undergraduate classes at a large Midwestern 
university.  In exchange for participation, participants received course extra credit.  A 
total of 287 participants reported their ages, which ranged from 18 to 36 years of age.  
The average age of the participants was 20.52 years (SD = 2.36) with more women (n = 
203) than men (n = 86) participating.  The majority of the participants identified as white 
(n = 254) while the rest identified as black (n = 32), Asian (n = 4), or did not indicate 
their race (n = 6). Eight participants did not indicate gender. 
Design and Procedure 
 The study was a 2 (statement type:  apology v. excuse) x 2 (familiarity:  familiar 
v. unfamiliar) x 2 (eye contact:  steady v. shifty) x 2 (speech rate:  normal v. rapid) 
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between-groups design.  Due to random assignment the cells were somewhat unbalanced, 
with 13-26 participants per condition.  The main dependent variables were compensatory 
damage awards, ratings of sincerity, ratings of believability, and measures of participants’ 
trust tendencies. 
 Participants completed the study via Qualtrics, an online data-gathering source.  
After reading and electronically signing an informed consent, participants read a brief 
summary of facts regarding a misdiagnosis of appendicitis which resulted in serious 
complications for the patient.  The two parties involved were George Thompson (the 
patient/plaintiff) and Michael Johnson (the physician/defendant).  The summary involved 
written statements from both George Thompson and Dr. Johnson (Appendix A).  
Participants read instructions informing them that another jury has found Dr. Johnson 
liable and that it is their responsibility to award damages (Appendix B).  Before awarding 
damages participants watched a videotaped statement from Dr. Johnson, in which he 
offered either an apology (Appendix C) or an excuse for what happened (Appendix D).  
The statement came after participants first read the facts of the case.  The video was of 
Dr. Johnson looking into the camera and lasted approximately one to two minutes in 
length and contained the manipulations of eye contact and speech rate.  In the rapid 
speech rate condition Dr. Johnson spoke at an increased rate with no natural 
stops/hesitations.  In the normal speech rate condition Dr. Johnson spoke at a 
conversational pace.  In the shifty condition, Dr. Johnson alternately looked between the 
camera and in a downward, sidelong direction.  In the steady condition Dr. Johnson 
maintained consistent eye contact with the camera.  In the shifty condition Dr. Johnson 
looked away when offering his initial statement.  Because of the relationship between 
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shifty eyes and deception, it was important to have the two coincide in the video (i.e., 
indicate possible deception with the manipulation). 
 Subsequent to watching the video, participants had the opportunity to award 
compensatory damages (Appendix E).  I chose to focus on compensatory damages as the 
malpractice presented here is likely not reprehensible enough to warrant punitive 
damages.  Participants then answered questions designed to assess their perceptions of 
various parts of the study (Appendix F), including perceptions of Dr. Johnson and George 
Thompson.  The questions asked participants to rate Dr. Johnson’s responsibility, how 
satisfactory Dr. Johnson’s statement was, how justified George Thompson was in suing 
Dr. Johnson.  Each question was a Likert-type question, with responses ranging from one 
to five.  Two important questions asked participants to rate the sincerity and believability 
of Dr. Johnson’s statements.  Participants also answered open-ended questions designed 
to get at their own definitions/understandings of what sincerity and believability mean in 
this context. 
 Participants completed the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS; Rotter, 1967, 1971; 
Appendix G), a 25-item measure designed to gauge one’s trust of a number of groups of 
people, such as parents, teachers, and physicians.  The ITS is an additive scale, with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of trust.  The reported split-half reliability is .76, 
with test-retest reliability .56, and .68 across 7- and 3-month intervals, respectively 
(Rotter, 1967, 1971). 
 Next, participants completed the Faith in People Scale (FPS; Rosenberg, 1957; 
Appendix H).  This 5-item scale is meant to assess one’s overall faith in other people by 
giving participants forced-choice answer options to statements regarding others’ 
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trustworthiness and concern for others.  This scale has a coefficient of reproducibility of 
.92 (Rosenberg, 1957). 
 The last measure for participants assessed dispositional trust with items taken 
from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP, Goldberg, 1999; Appendix I). 
 Finally, participants completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix J).  The 
entire process took approximately 15-20 minutes.  After completing the demographic 
form, participants received a debriefing statement and were thanked for their 
participation. 
Pilot Testing 
 Before data collection, in order to ensure my manipulations were sufficiently 
strong I pilot tested the vignette and video statements.  After reading the vignette and 
watching the video I asked participants (N = 80) questions relating to the manipulations 
only.  Results indicated that participants were receptive to the manipulations. 
 To assess whether participants were receptive to the familiarity manipulation I 
asked participants, “Had George Thompson ever visited Dr. Johnson before the visit 
which resulted in the lawsuit?”  Participants responded to a forced-choice Yes/No option.  
Of the 45 participants in the familiar condition, 40 correctly identified George Thompson 
and Dr. Johnson as having a previous relationship.  Of the 35 participants in the 
unfamiliar condition, 28 correctly identified George Thompson and Dr. Johnson as 
having no previous relationship.  Results from a Chi-square analysis revealed a 
significant effect, χ² (1) = 21.39, p < .01. 
 To assess whether participants perceived Dr. Johnson apologizing or not I asked 
participants, “Did Dr. Johnson say ‘I’m sorry’ at any point when he was making his 
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statement?”  Participants responded to a forced-choice Yes/No option.  Of the 39 
participants in the apology condition, 37 correctly indicated Dr. Johnson had said “I’m 
sorry.”  Of the 40 participants in the excuse condition 34 correctly indicated Dr. Johnson 
had not said “I’m sorry.”  Results from a Chi-square analysis showed a significant effect, 
χ² (1) = 10.22, p < .01. 
To assess the effect of eye contact I asked participants to rate how steadily Dr. 
Johnson maintained eye contact during his statement.  Participants rated eye contact on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“completely”).  The average rating 
was 2.85 (SD = 1.49).  Results from a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a 
significant effect of eye contact (F (1, 78) = 45.64, p < .01).  The average rating in the 
shifty condition was 1.98 (SD = 1.19) and was 3.77 (SD = 1.18). 
To assess the effect of the speech rate I asked participants to rate how quickly Dr. 
Johnson spoke.  Participants rated speech rate on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(“very slowly”) to 5 (“very quickly”).  The average rating was 3.05 (SD = 1.08).  Results 
from a one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect for speech rate (F (1, 78) = 57.66, p 
< .01).  The average rating in the normal condition was 2.32 (SD = .66) and 3.71 (SD = 
.94) in the rapid condition. 
CHAPTER 9:  Results  
Manipulation Checks 
 I conducted analyses to determine if the participants in the main study responded 
to the manipulation checks.  I employed the same analysis techniques as in Pilot Testing 
and used the same questions as indications of responsivity to the manipulations. 
76 
 
 As with pilot testing, the manipulations were having an effect.  Results indicated 
that familiarity did have an effect (χ² (1) = 84.77, p < .001) as did statement type (χ² (1) = 
53.65, p < .001). 
Sincerity 
To assess main effects and interactions of the independent variables on ratings of 
believability I conducted a four-way ANOVA with statement type, eye contact, speech 
rate and familiarity as the independent variables and sincerity as the dependent variable.  
Participants offered ratings of sincerity on a Likert-type scale which ranged from 1 (“not 
at all sincere”) to 5 (“completely sincere”).  The effect size for the corrected model was 
.20 (r = .11).  The average sincerity rating was 3.79 (SD = 1.00).  No significant main 
effects emerged, although each condition (save familiarity) was trending toward 
significance.  The only significant interaction to emerge was between statement type and 
speech rate with participants in the apology, normal condition rating the statement as 
more sincere (M = 4.15) as more sincere than participants in the apology, rapid condition 
(M = 3.71) or either of the excuse conditions (normal, M = 3.68, rapid, M = 3.73).  Table 
1 provides the F statistics and significance values for this analysis. 
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Table 9.1 
 
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Sincerity 
 
Main Effects and 
Interactions 
F p η² 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
3.52 
 
.06 
 
.01 
Eye Contact 
 
2.58 .11 .01 
Speech Rate 
 
2.65 .11 .01 
Familiarity 
 
.00 .99 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact 
 
.10 .76 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate 
 
4.41 .04 .02 
Statement Type * 
Familiarity 
 
.29 .59 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate 
 
1.21 .27 .00 
Eye Contact * 
Familiarity 
 
.23 .63 .00 
Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
 
1.70 .19 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate 
 
2.55 .11 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Familiarity 
 
.95 .33 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
.00 .98 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
.04 .85 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
.14 .71 .00 
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Although not significant, the main effect for apology was approaching 
significance with participants in the apology condition rating the statement as more 
sincere (M = 3.93) than participants in the excuse condition (M = 3.70).  Similarly, main 
effects were trending toward significance for both eye contact and speech rate.  Analyses 
show sincerity ratings being higher when eye contact was steady (M = 3.91) rather than 
shifty (M = 3.72) and when the speech rate was normal (M = 3.91) rather than when it 
was rapid (M = 3.72), although these differences are not statistically significant. 
Content Analyses 
After rating how sincere they believed Dr. Johnson’s statement to be, participants 
had the opportunity to answer an open-ended question meant to assess what made the 
statement (not) sincere.  The most common responses here dealt with the defendant’s 
tone of voice and also the type of statement he provided.  Participants often directly 
mentioned tone of voice when describing the defendant’s sincerity (e.g., “His tone of 
voice made him sound sincere”).  Participants also directly mentioned his apology (e.g., 
“He offered an apology for what happened”).  Other categories included 
professionalism/competence, rate of speech, eye contact, and overall demeanor (e.g., 
body language, facial expressions).  Table 2 provides a breakdown of the major 
categories created and the number of responses included in each category, as well as 
typical examples of answers for each category.  Table 3 provides the Chi-square statistics 
for the relationship between the independent variables and the categories of believability.  
A significant relationship did emerge for eye contact; more people in the shifty condition 
mentioned eye contact than did participants in the steady condition.  Also, although not 
significant, the relationship with statement type was approaching significance; 
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participants in the apology condition made reference to the statement more than did 
participants in the excuse condition. 
Table 9.2 
 
Categories of Sincerity Content Analysis 
 
Category Response Count Example 
Professionalism/Competence 20 “I felt that Dr. Johnson 
made it clear that he looks 
out for the health and well-
being of each and every 
one of his patients.” 
“He kept mentioned [sic] 
how he tries to help any 
patient no matter who they 
are.” 
Tone of Voice 37 “He had a very calming 
voice…” 
“His tone of voice seemed 
very sincere.” 
Rate of Speech 3 “…talked slowly…” 
Eye Contact 36 “He did not look into the 
camera…” 
“He had trouble looking 
into the camera.” 
Statement Effect 22 “…he reiterated his 
apology multiple times…” 
“…apologizing to his 
patient...” 
Overall Demeanor 33 “…his facial expressions 
seemed sincere.” 
“he showed shameful facial 
expressions” 
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Table 9.3 
 
Chi-square Statistics for Independent Variables and Sincerity Content Categories 
 
Manipulation  χ² p 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
10.20 
 
.07 
 
Eye Contact 
 
15.59 .02 
 
Speech Rate  8.56 .20 
 
Familiarity  6.34 .39 
 
Believability 
To assess main effects and interactions of the independent variables on ratings of 
believability I conducted a four-way ANOVA with statement type, eye contact, speech 
rate and familiarity as the independent variables and believability as the dependent 
variable.  Participants offered ratings of believability on a Likert-type scale which ranged 
from 1 (“not at all believable”) to 5 (“completely believable”).  The average believability 
rating was 3.71 (SD = .94).  No significant main effects emerged, although a significant 
statement type by speech rate interaction did emerge with participants in the apology, 
normal speech rate condition rating the statement as more believable (M = 4.02) than 
participants in the apology, rapid condition (M = 3.59), or either of the excuse conditions 
(normal, M = 3.60, rapid, M = 3.67).  The statement type X eye contact X speech rate 
interaction was approaching significance.  Table 4 provides the F statistics and 
significance values for this analysis. 
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Table 9.4 
 
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Believability 
 
Main Effects and 
Interactions 
F p η² 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
2.20 
 
.14 
 
.01 
Eye Contact 
 
.05 .82 .00 
Speech Rate 
 
2.42 .12 .01 
Familiarity 
 
.41 .53 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact 
 
.33 .56 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate 
 
4.89 .03 .02 
Statement Type * 
Familiarity 
 
.13 .72 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate 
 
.28 .60 .00 
Eye Contact * 
Familiarity 
 
.25 .62 .00 
Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
 
.58 .45 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate 
 
3.23 .07 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Familiarity 
 
2.20 .14 .01 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
.05 .82 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
1.32 .25 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
.00 .98 .00 
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Content Analyses 
After rating how believable they believed Dr. Johnson’s statement to be, 
participants had the opportunity to answer an open-ended question meant to assess what 
made the statement (not) believable.  As with sincerity, I was looking to see if reasons 
given differed as a function of the independent variables.  The most common responses 
here related to Dr. Johnson’s professionalism/competence.  Typical responses coded here 
include things such as, “I don’t think that a doctor would give the wrong diagnosis on 
purpose” and “I believe Dr. Johnson was doing all the tests he needed to do with the 
information from George Thompson he was given.”  Table 5 provides a breakdown of 
responses and categories.  Table 6 provides the Chi-square statistics for analyses 
assessing the relationship between the believability categories and the independent 
variables.  No significant relationships emerged between the believability categories and 
statement type, speech rate, or familiarity.  A significant relationship did emerge between 
eye contact and believability categories.  Those in the shifty condition mentioned eye 
contact significantly more than did those in the steady condition. 
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Table 9.5 
 
Categories of Believability Content Analysis 
 
Category Response Count Example 
Professionalism/Competence 62 “He talked about how he 
did not want to put the 
patient through any 
unecessary [sic] test.” 
“It was believable because 
he made it seem like he 
really did think George just 
had the flu and the 
symptoms were the same 
as the flu.” 
Tone of Voice 19 “His tone of voice…” 
“…a serious apologetic 
tone” 
Rate of Speech 5 “He didn’t rush through 
it.” 
“There was little to no 
hesitation in his voice.” 
Eye Contact 23 “He couldn’t look at the 
video camera…” 
“I think it was not 
believable because he didnt 
[sic] make eye contact very 
often…” 
“It wasn’t believable due 
to the fact that he could’t 
[sic] look into the camera 
and talk.” 
Statement Effect 21 “…he apologized a couple 
times” 
“He seemed to completely 
sincere [sic] and said he 
was ‘truly sorry’.” 
Overall Demeanor 40 “His body language is 
sincere.” 
“His facial expressions 
looked sorry.” 
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Table 9.6 
 
Chi-square Statistics for Independent Variables and Believability Content Categories 
 
Manipulation  χ² p 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
1.56 
 
.96 
 
Eye Contact 
 
14.22 .03 
 
Speech Rate  3.18 .40 
 
Familiarity  1.23 .98 
 
Compensatory Damages 
 I asked participants to assess compensatory damages if they felt the plaintiff 
deserved recompense.  Only 159 participants provided actual numerical damage awards, 
which ranged from $0 to $400,000 (M = $31506.30, SD = $48693.04).  Of the 
participants who did not enter a value numerically, 68 mentioned they would award 
damages on par with the amount of money the plaintiff lost due to missing work and his 
future medical expenses.  Therefore, I conducted analyses only with the 159 data points 
containing actual numbers. 
 Results from a four-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions.  Table 7 provides the F statistics and significance values for this analysis. 
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Table 9.7 
 
ANOVA Statistics for Compensatory Damages 
 
Main Effects and 
Interactions 
F p η² 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
2.14 
 
.15 
 
.01 
Eye Contact 
 
2.51 .12 .02 
Speech Rate 
 
.00 .99 .00 
Familiarity 
 
.41 .52 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact 
 
.59 .44 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate 
 
.16 .69 .00 
Statement Type * 
Familiarity 
 
.09 .76 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate 
 
2.42 .12 .02 
Eye Contact * 
Familiarity 
 
.30 .59 .00 
Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
 
1.95 .17 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate 
 
.89 .35 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Familiarity 
 
1.93 .17 .01 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
.72 .40 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
.07 .79 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
.22 .64 .00 
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Perceptions of Defendant 
 I used three different ratings to assess participants’ perceptions of the defendant:  
explanation satisfaction, compassion, and agreement with the liability judgment.  I 
predicted main effects for eye contact and speech rate.  I hypothesized that less eye 
contact and a faster speech rate would result in less positive perceptions of the defendant.  
I also hypothesized a main effect for statement type.  Specifically I predicted more 
positive perceptions of the defendant when he apologized instead of offering an excuse. 
Explanation Satisfaction 
Participants rated how satisfactorily they felt the defendant’s statement explained 
the circumstances of the case.  Ratings fell on a Likert-type scale which ranged from 1 
(“not at all satisfactory”) to 5 (“completely satisfactory”).  Average satisfactory ratings 
were 3.55 (SD = .97). 
I conducted a four-way between-groups ANOVA using explanation satisfaction 
as the dependent variable.  Table 8 provides the F statistics and significance values for 
this analysis. 
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Table 9.8 
 
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Explanation Satisfaction 
 
Main Effects and 
Interactions 
F p η² 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
3.18 
 
.01 
 
.02 
Eye Contact 
 
.63 .43 .00 
Speech Rate 
 
1.61 .21 .00 
Familiarity 
 
.56 .46 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact 
 
1.31 .25 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate 
 
.84 .36 .00 
Statement Type * 
Familiarity 
 
.65 .42 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate 
 
.14 .71 .00 
Eye Contact * 
Familiarity 
 
.01 .92 .00 
Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
 
4.88 .03 .02 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate 
 
.53 .47 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Familiarity 
 
.61 .44 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
1.06 .30  
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
3.11 .08 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
.05 .82 .00 
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Results from a four-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for statement 
type.  Participants in the apology condition rated the explanation as more satisfactory (M 
= 3.69) than did participants in the excuse condition (M = 3.40).  A significant interaction 
emerged between speech rate and familiarity, with participants in the normal speech rate, 
unfamiliar condition rating the explanation as more satisfactory (M = 3.70) than 
participants in the normal, familiar (M = 3.54), rapid, unfamiliar (M = 3.30), and rapid, 
familiar (M = 3.64) conditions. 
Compassion 
A second analysis of perception came from impressions of the defendant’s 
compassion.  Specifically, participants rated “In your opinion, how compassionate is Dr. 
Johnson?” on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“not at all compassionate”) to 5 
(“extremely compassionate”).  The average rating was 3.42 (SD = .95). 
I conducted a four-way between-groups ANOVA using compassion as the 
dependent variable.  Table 9 provides the F statistics and significance values for this 
analysis. 
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Table 9.9 
 
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Defendant’s Compassion 
 
Main Effects and 
Interactions 
F p η² 
 
Statement Type 
 
7.55 
 
.01 
 
 
.03 
Eye Contact .01 .94 
 
.00 
Speech Rate 1.53 .22 
 
.01 
Familiarity .36 .55 
 
.00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact 
.65 .42 
 
.00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate 
 
3.28 .07 
 
.01 
Statement Type * 
Familiarity 
 
.04 .84 
 
.00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate 
.24 .62 
 
.00 
 
Eye Contact * 
Familiarity 
 
 
.11 
 
.74 
 
.00 
Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
 
.27 .60 .00 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate 
 
2.66 .10 .01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Familiarity 
 
.06 .81 .00 
Statement Type * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
.40 .53 .00 
Eye Contact * Speech 
Rate * Familiarity 
 
2.51 .12 
 
.01 
Statement Type * Eye 
Contact * Speech Rate * 
Familiarity 
1.80 .81 .01 
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A main effect emerged for statement type, with participants in the apology 
condition rating Dr. Johnson as more compassionate (M = 3.57) than participants in the 
excuse condition (M = 3.26). 
The interaction between statement type and speech rate was approaching 
significance.  Participants in the apology, normal speech rate condition rated Dr. Johnson 
as more compassionate (M = 3.75) than in the apology, rapid (M = 3.40), excuse, normal 
(M = 3.23), and excuse, rapid (M = 3.30) conditions. 
Because ratings of compassion and explanation satisfaction were highly 
correlated (r = .52, p < .001) I conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANCOVA) using compassion and explanation satisfaction as dependent variables.  To 
control for dispositional trust, ITS was entered as a covariate.  No significant effect for 
the covariate emerged (F (2, 229) = 2.25, p = .11).  Analyses revealed a significant main 
effect for statement type (F (2, 229) = 3.38, p = .04).  Follow-up ANCOVAs revealed 
significant differences between apologies and excuses for both compassion ratings (F (1, 
230) = 5.61, p = .02) and explanation satisfaction (F (1, 230) = 4.42, p = .04).  This is 
identical to the patterns reported above. 
Agreement with Verdict 
As a proxy for perceptions of the defendant’s responsibility I asked the 
categorical question of whether they agreed with the verdict that Dr. Johnson was liable.  
Ten participants did not respond, but the majority of participants (n = 194) did agree with 
the verdict.  Ninety-three participants did not agree with the verdict.  Results from 
Pearson’s Chi-square analyses revealed no significant relationships between any of the 
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independent variables and agreement with liability.  Table 10 provides the Chi-square 
statistics and significance values for the analyses. 
Table 9.10 
 
Chi-square Statistics for Agreement with Verdict 
 
Manipulation  χ² p η² 
 
Statement Type 
 
 
2.11 
 
.15 
 
 
.00 
Eye Contact 
 
.00 .99 
 
.00 
Speech Rate  .18 .68 
 
.01 
Familiarity  .24 .63 .03 
 
Correlational Analyses 
 Believability and Sincerity 
 I conducted a correlation on believability and sincerity ratings.  Results showed a 
significant positive correlation between believability and sincerity (r = .73, p = .00). 
 Because believability and sincerity were highly correlated, I conducted a 4-way 
MANCOVA with sincerity and believability ratings as the dependent variables.  To 
control for dispositional trust ITS was entered as a covariate.  No significant covariate 
effect emerged (F (2, 230) = 1.34, p = .27).  Results from the MANCOVA indicated no 
significant main effects or interactions, although the apology x speech rate interaction 
was approaching significance (F (2, 230) = 2.65, p = .07).  Follow-up ANCOVAs 
showed a significant interaction between apology and speech rate, for both sincerity (F 
(1, 231) = 4.32, p = .04) and believability (F (1, 231) = 4.89, p = .03).  This pattern was 
identical to those reported in the individual ANOVAs above. 
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Interpersonal Trust 
I hypothesized that a higher score on the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS; Rotter, 
1967) would negatively correlate with perceived justification in suing the defendant.  
Participants rated their agreement to 25 items on the ITS with a 5-point rating scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).  A total score indicates the 
participant’s trust score.  The average ITS score was 66.10 (SD = 5.13, α = .41).  
Although the alpha is quite low, the ITS is an established measure so I proceeded with 
analysis using the scores from this study. 
Participants also determined the justification for the plaintiff bringing the suit 
against the doctor.  Participants provided their answers on a Likert-type scale which 
ranged from 1 (not at all justified) to 5 (completely justified).  The average response to 
the question was 3.29 (SD = .95). 
A bivariate correlation between ITS score and justification rating revealed no 
significant relationship (r (1, 253) = .08, p = .22).  This did not support the hypothesis 
that ITS scores and justification ratings would negatively correlate. 
Faith in People 
In addition to the ITS participants completed Rosenberg’s (1957) Faith in People 
Scale (FPS).  Participants responded to forced-choice options to a series of five questions 
or statements.  To establish a participants’ score I summed their responses to create a 
total score.  For answers reflecting faith in other people (e.g., agreeing with the statement, 
“Human nature is fundamentally cooperative”) participants received a score of two 
whereas disagreeing with such a statement would result in a score of one.  Therefore 
higher scores reflected greater faith in people.  I reverse coded questions three and four, 
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respectively.  The average score on the FPS was 7.23 (SD = 1.42, α = .61).  A bivariate 
correlation between FPS score and justification rating revealed no significant relationship 
(r (1, 287), = -.07, p = .26). 
International Personality Item Pool 
Finally, participants completed a subset of items from the International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999).  Participants rated statements pertaining to 
themselves on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“very inaccurate”) to 5 (“very 
accurate”).  The average score on the IPIP was 3.41 (SD = .41, α = .42).  Although the 
alpha is quite low, the IPIP is an established measure so I proceeded with analysis using 
the scores from this study.  As with the ITS and FPS, I conducted a correlation between 
IPIP scores and justification for bringing the lawsuit.  A bivariate correlation between 
IPIP and justification rating revealed no significant correlation between IPIP scores and 
justification ratings (r (1, 287) = .07, p = .27). 
CHAPTER 10:  Discussion 
The results of the current research add to the body of literature surrounding 
apologies.  Although not statistically significant, the research presented here indicated 
that an apology can affect how sincerely people view it.  An apology did have a 
significant effect on how participants viewed the defendant.  Overall apologies resulted in 
greater satisfaction with the defendant’s statement and greater attribution of compassion 
to the defendant than did excuses.  When interacting with how quickly one speaks the 
results become significant for offering an apology:  Participants rated statements as more 
sincere and more believable when an apology was offered and when the defendant spoke 
at a normal, rather than a rapid, pace. 
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 The current research sought to more fully explore factors affecting perceptions of 
apologies.  As noted previously, apologies play an important role in everyday life and can 
have far-reaching implications.  One area in which apologies can play a vital role is in the 
medical setting.  Doctors are often advised not to make any apology to their patients due 
to the fear that it might lead to negative outcomes (e.g., lawsuits) for the physician.  A 
growing body of literature is indicating, however, that apologies can have healing effects 
in such contexts.  A better understanding of factors affecting an observer’s perception of 
an apology can have implications for how people respond to transgressions in the future. 
Sincerity 
 One way to measure a statement’s effectiveness is to assess how sincerely people 
perceive the speaker to be.  In instances of public apologies, people are often skeptical of 
the transgressor’s motivation and may be less inclined to perceive the apology as 
accurately reflecting the transgressor’s true feelings.  In the current research I 
manipulated certain variables I felt would affect perceptions of a transgressor’s sincerity.  
Although no significant main effects emerged for the independent variables, they did 
trend toward significance.  (The exception was the familiarity manipulation, which was 
nowhere near significance.)  Additionally, a significant interaction emerged between 
statement type and speech rate; participants who viewed the apology spoken at a normal 
rate judged the statement to be most sincere.  These trends suggest that what statement is 
offered, as well as the manner in which it is offered, can leave an impression on an 
observer.  Indeed, analyses of open-ended responses indicated that the speaker’s eye 
contact, body language, and tone all affected how sincere participants believed him to be. 
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Believability 
 Another measurement in the current research dealt with how believable 
participants rated the statements they viewed.  As expected, ratings of believability and 
sincerity were very highly correlated and previous research has done little to distinguish 
between these two concepts.  As noted in the introduction, however, believability and 
sincerity, though related, do not refer to the same concept.  One goal of this research, 
then, was to try and differentiate these concepts more clearly. 
 Results of various analyses indicated no significant main effects for the 
independent variables.  As with sincerity, though, a significant interaction did emerge 
between speech rate and statement type; participants who viewed the apology spoken at a 
normal rate judged it to be more believable than in other conditions.  Analyses of open-
ended answers to the question of what made the statement believable were largely similar 
to the answers to the question regarding sincerity.  Most participants noted things such as 
body language, tone of voice, and eye contact as factors affecting the believability of the 
statement. 
Compensatory Damages 
 No significant main effects or interactions emerged for the dependent variable of 
compensatory damages.  A possible explanation for this could relate to the limited data (n 
= 159) available for analysis. 
Perceptions of the Defendant 
 In terms of overall feeling about the defendant I asked participants to rate some 
proxy variables:  explanation satisfaction, the defendant’s level of compassion, and 
agreement with the verdict.  In terms of explanation satisfaction, a significant main effect 
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emerged for statement type; participants who viewed the apology rated the statement as 
more satisfactory than participants who viewed the excuse.  A significant interaction 
emerged between speech rate and familiarity; a normal speech rate and no familiarity 
between the plaintiff and defendant resulted in more satisfaction with the explanation 
provided. 
 As with explanation satisfaction, a main effect emerged for statement type when 
rating how compassionate the defendant was; participants who viewed the apology rated 
him as more compassionate.  Although not significant, the interaction between speech 
rate and statement type was on trend, with participants viewing the apology spoken at a 
normal rate judging Dr. Johnson as being more compassionate. 
 Finally, a majority of participants agreed with the liability judgment, regardless of 
what condition they were in. 
Trust Measures 
 A final dependent variable in this study related to participants’ levels of trust.  
Participants completed a number of trust scales and results from correlational analyses 
indicated no significant correlations between trust scores and justification ratings.  
Overall, no significant relationship emerged between trust and ratings of the plaintiff’s 
justification for bringing a lawsuit. 
Limitations 
 Although promising results did emerge, some limitations did arise. 
 One limitation in this study involved the medium through which participants 
viewed the statement.  In an actual case observers would observe the defendant making a 
statement in person rather than on a video.  Indeed, some answers in the content analyses 
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indicated suspicion that the person in the video was an actor rather than an actual 
defendant.  Although I manipulated factors relevant to this study, observing a person live 
rather than recorded allows observers to take other factors into account.  Also, as this was 
related to a court case, participants might have expected to see the statement in a 
courtroom context. 
 Another limitation of this study involved the participant pool.  Although previous 
research (e.g., Bornstein, 1999) has shown that student populations do not significantly 
differ from general populations in mock jury studies, a possibility still exists that an older 
population might have viewed this study differently.  Older populations, for example, 
might have more experience with the medical system in terms of having more doctor 
visits and facing more serious health issues.  Further, older populations might be more in 
tune with George Thompson’s problems of missing work and requiring follow-up 
medical care, which could possibly affect their perceptions of the case. 
 The sample in this study was racially homogenous.  A more diverse sample could 
have led to different effects.  Research (e.g., Williams, Burns, & Harmon, 2009) has 
shown that one’s culture can affect one’s response to eye contact.  In Western cultures, 
for example, eye contact is encouraged, while Hispanic and Native American cultures 
view eye contact as disrespectful.  A more diverse sample might provide insight into how 
different cultures perceive (a lack of) eye contact on the defendant’s part. 
 A larger number of participants could affect some of the results reported here.  A 
number of findings were near significance.  A larger number of participants might help 
make these marginally significant findings significant. 
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 In terms of the manipulations, although pilot testing indicated participants did 
respond to the manipulations, changing them could have more of an effect.  For example, 
no main effects emerged for eye contact.  One reason for this could be how eye contact 
was manipulated.  In the shifty condition, the gaze aversion might have lasted too long, 
making it seem as if the defendant were reading a prepared statement rather than being 
(potentially) dishonest.  Based on open-ended answers provided, a number of participants 
did note that they believed Dr. Johnson was simply reading a statement, which may or 
may not indicate some form of deception or dishonesty.  Future work might benefit from 
having the speaker’s eye contact be more erratic than what it was here. 
 Another potential limitation was not having participants make liability judgments.  
In the current research participants learned the defendant was liable before watching his 
statement.  A more conventional approach would be to have the participants determine 
liability and then proceed through the rest of the study.  Establishing liability for 
participants might have signaled to them the defendant was only making a statement to 
save his own skin or because his attorney advised him to do so.  Some of the open-ended 
answers did indicate this line of thinking, with participants noting “He’s only doing this 
because his lawyer told him to” or “He just wants to look good.” 
Implications 
 Although there are limitations in this study, the results do have some implications.  
Consistent with previous research, results here indicated that apologizing can have 
positive implications for the transgressor.  Although no significant main effects emerged 
on sincerity or believability, overall perceptions of the defendant were better when he 
offered an apology than when he did not.  Specifically, participants rated the defendant as 
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more compassionate and were more satisfied with his explanation of the situation when 
he explicitly said “I’m sorry.”  The fact that participants viewed the doctor more 
favorably after he apologized can lend itself to potential policy changes in intersecting 
medical and legal communities.  Instead of being afraid to apologize, physicians might 
help their cases (and themselves) by offering an apology.  This is in line with previous 
research (e.g., Robbennolt, 2003; Vincent & Young, 1994) indicating people are more 
willing to settle or even avoid litigation in the face of an apology from the offending 
party. 
Future Directions 
 More research needs to be done in the area of apologies to start to develop a 
picture of all that can affect the (lack of) effectiveness of apologies and excuses (as well 
as other types of accounts).  With the current research I examined only a few of the many 
factors affecting perceptions of apologies.  Variables such as injury severity (e.g., 
Schlenker & Darby, 1981; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992), the timing of the apology (e.g., 
Bornstein et al., 2002; Kremer & Stephens, 1983; Lazare, 2006), and motivation for 
making the statement (e.g., Risen & Gilovich, 2007) can all impact perceptions of 
apologies. 
 Changing the manipulations to exploit these variables could be helpful (e.g., 
making liability judgments, viewing the statement before and after making a liability 
judgment). 
Conclusions 
Recently, conservative radio talk-show host Rush Limbaugh referred to 
Georgetown Law student Sandra Fluke as a “slut.”  Limbaugh’s comment came after 
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Fluke testified before Congress regarding a proposed mandate requiring health insurance 
to cover birth control.  In her testimony, Fluke noted she was in favor of such a mandate, 
a stance with which Limbaugh took issue.  Limbaugh went on to comment that Fluke 
wanted the American public essentially to pay for her to have sex by providing insurance 
coverage for her birth control pills.  As it turned out, Limbaugh’s message did not sit well 
with a number of people, including several of his advertisers.  Days after his commentary 
regarding Fluke, Limbaugh offered a public apology, noting that “he was ‘sincerely’ 
sorry about his ‘insulting’ characterization of Fluke” (Hart & Mirkinson, 2012).  Sandra 
Fluke subsequently refused his apology, stating that she believed Limbaugh only offered 
the apology due to pressure from his show’s sponsors (Lavender, 2012). 
 The recent episode between Rush Limbaugh and Sandra Fluke served to illustrate 
what people expect when a transgression has occurred.  Although this happened on a 
national stage, transgressions are a part of daily life and social norms dictate how those 
involved with transgressions must deal with them.  Between the person(s) who erred and 
the person(s) harmed by the error, a dynamic relationship exists, one requiring proper 
responses from the respective parties when a transgression has occurred. 
 A common approach to rectifying the injury caused via a transgression is to offer 
an apology.  As noted previously, apologies consist of “admissions of blameworthiness 
and regret by the actor” (Schlenker & Darby, 1982, p. 271).  Although often healing, 
apologies can have some unintended consequences for the apologizer, however.  One 
concern for the actor is how others will view him once he has offered an apology.  If one 
apologizes then one has, by Schlenker and Darby’s definition, taken the responsibility for 
the transgression and its outcome.  Some people fear that this acceptance of responsibility 
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will lower others’ opinions of them.  Another concern is the potential for negative 
consequences of apologizing.  By admitting blameworthiness some people might fear 
they are opening themselves up to more punishment than if they downplay or deny their 
involvement with the transgression. 
 As mentioned above, Sandra Fluke did not accept the apology offered by Rush 
Limbaugh.  In the realm of public apologies, people often remain reluctant to accept the 
verbal olive branch.  Why might this be?  While observers might rush to point out that 
Limbaugh (probably) only apologized due to outside pressure rather than genuine 
remorse for his actions, research shows that observers judged victims more negatively 
when they rejected an offender’s apology, even if the apology is seen as insincere (Risen 
& Gilovich, 2007; see also Bennett & Dewberry, 1994).  Therefore, even if one is 
disinclined to accept an apology, norms dictate that she is better off accepting the 
apology than rejecting it. 
 The research conducted by Risen and Gilovich (2007) raised an interesting point:  
What might make an apology seem sincere?  No doubt everyone has at one time offered 
(and just as likely been the recipient of) an apology with at least a (slight) lack of 
sincerity.  What differentiates a sincere apology from an insincere apology?  Does 
perceived sincerity affect how believable an observer believes the apology to be?  The 
research presented here sought to explore various factors which might affect the sincerity 
and believability of an apology. 
One area in which apologies can play a vital role is medical malpractice.  
Unfortunately, medical errors occur daily.  These errors might be relatively minor or they 
might have serious, far-reaching consequences.  In response to making an error, a number 
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of physicians indicated a desire to offer an apology to the patient (or patient’s family, 
where appropriate; e.g., Gallagher et al., 2003).  An interesting disconnect seems to be 
taking place, however, because a number of medical practitioners are often told not to 
offer an apology as it could be used at a later time as an admission of guilt.  To this end, a 
number of states have established at least some legal protections for apologies or 
statements of remorse (see McDonnell & Guenther, 2008).  Patients, however, often 
desire an apology, and some have indicated an apology would have made them more 
likely to settle malpractice claims (e.g., Robbennolt, 2003) or not follow through with 
legal action at all (e.g., Vincent & Young, 1994).  A medical malpractice case, then, 
offered an interesting avenue to study apologies. 
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Appendix A:  Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Statements 
 
In January 2009, Dr. Michael Johnson stood trial for medical malpractice.  The suit, 
brought by George Thompson, a former patient of Dr. Johnson’s, alleged that Dr. 
Johnson misdiagnosed his appendicitis, leading to severe and ongoing complications.  
Below are statements from Dr. Johnson and George Thompson. 
 
Statement of George Thompson: 
 
I went to Dr. Johnson on Tuesday, November 3, 2009.  [That was my first visit to Dr. 
Johnson, since, I don’t have a regular physician and a colleague of mine 
recommended Dr. Johnson.]  [Dr. Johnson has been my regular physician for the 
past five years.  Over that time, I have probably consulted Dr. Johnson three times.]  
For a few days prior to seeing Dr. Johnson I had some abdominal cramping, nausea, and 
a slight fever.  After the symptoms persisted, I went to Dr. Johnson who informed me I 
had the stomach flu.  He suggested I get more rest, eat bland food, and try to stay 
hydrated.  I followed his advice, but after a few days I still did not feel any better.  I made 
another appointment and again Dr. Johnson informed me I had a severe case of stomach 
flu and gave me the same instructions as before.  I took his advice and began feeling 
better for a day or two.  On the second night, however, I woke up with a terrible fever and 
an intense pain in my side.  I could barely move, but managed to make it to my phone 
and call for an ambulance.  The paramedics arrived and took me to the hospital where I 
underwent an emergency appendectomy.  After waking up I spoke with the surgeon, who 
informed me my appendix had burst.  When he removed my appendix, he also noted it 
was gangrenous and necrotic.  After asking him about how long it would take for my 
appendix to become gangrenous and necrotic he informed me that an appendix usually 
starts causing problems before it gets to the point where it bursts. 
 
While in the hospital I developed an infection and had to have an additional surgery.  
After the surgery I had to be fed through a tube painfully threaded through my nose to my 
stomach so I could get nutrients as I couldn’t eat solid food. 
 
Finally, a week after my surgery, I was able to leave the hospital.  I spent a week at home 
recovering before being able to return to work part-time.  Since then I have received 
medical attention twice for peptic ulcers, which are a side effect of my surgery and 
infection.  Doctors have told me I will suffer from these ulcers for the rest of my life. 
 
I work as a policy researcher for the government and earn $65,000 a year before taxes.  
At the time I became sick I had only been employed with the government for about three 
months.  Fortunately at the time I became ill I had full insurance coverage, which 
defrayed some of the costs of my medical expenses, but I still had to pay around $10,000 
of my own money; I was not reimbursed for those expenses.  From the time I began 
having symptoms to the time I returned to work part-time, I missed about two-and-a-half 
weeks of work, which I had to take as unpaid leave.  I worked part-time for two weeks 
before returning to work full-time.  Although I have recovered physically from my 
appendicitis, when my peptic ulcers flare up I am in extreme pain and usually have to 
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take two days off of work.  It’s impossible to predict how often I will have these flare 
ups, although doctors say it’s not uncommon to expect about 2-3 a year, which will result 
in 4-6 sick days a year. If I take too many sick days, some of them have to count as 
unpaid leave. 
 
Statement of Dr. Johnson: 
 
I have been a family physician with my own practice for 20 years.  I have established a 
steady clientele, and patients I saw as children are now returning to me with children of 
their own.  [Although I have an established patient list, I am always willing to accept 
new patients.]  [George Thompson has been a patient of mine for about five years, 
during which time I have seen him in the office on eight separate occasions for 
minor health issues, such as colds and allergies.] 
 
George Thompson came to see me [as a new patient] in November 2009 [prior to 
which I had never met him, personally or professionally], complaining of abdominal 
cramps and stomach pains.  He informed me he was nauseous, feverish, and somewhat 
dehydrated.  After examining him I determined he had stomach flu and sent him home 
with instructions that he rest, eat plain food, and stay hydrated.  He came to see me a few 
days later with the same symptoms, and I offered the same diagnosis and remedies.  I did 
not hear from George Thompson again until after his surgery and stay in the hospital.  I 
learned of his appendicitis and ensuing medical problems.  I was surprised to hear of his 
appendicitis, as his abdomen had not been tender in the location typically associated with 
appendicitis. 
 
Traditionally, appendicitis is somewhat difficult to diagnose.  Symptoms can closely 
mirror those of the stomach flu; abdominal discomfort, nausea, and vomiting are 
symptoms common to both ailments.  When I examined Mr. Thompson, there was a 
general abdominal tenderness, but nothing to suggest an inflamed appendix.  As Mr. 
Thompson’s symptoms were relatively minor, appendicitis seemed an unlikely diagnosis. 
 
When Mr. Thompson returned with the same symptoms a short time later, I conducted 
more thorough tests, including a white blood cell count and urinalysis.  Although his 
white blood cell count was somewhat elevated, I attributed this to his flu.  His urinalysis 
returned normal.  The only other test option for appendicitis was a CT scan.  Given the 
lack of strong evidence that Mr. Thompson had appendicitis, I never considered ordering 
a CT scan as it is costly and poses some risk to patients. 
 
As I did not treat him during or after his appendicitis surgery and his hospitalization I can 
offer no statement as to his experiences after our last appointment. 
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Appendix B:  Participant Instructions 
 
Participant Instructions 
 
After hearing testimony and sitting through a trial, a jury found Dr. Johnson had 
committed medical malpractice when he failed to diagnose the plaintiff’s appendicitis in 
a timely manner.  It is now your job to determine the appropriate compensation for 
George Thompson.  Before you do that, however, Dr. Johnson has prepared a brief 
statement. 
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Appendix C:  Defendant’s Statement (Apology) 
 
Dr. Johnson’s Statement 
 
[to camera] 
Thank you for allowing me to make this statement. 
 
[no pause between sentences] [look away] 
I would first like to say that I am truly sorry for what has happened to George Thompson.  
As a result of my failure to correctly diagnose his appendicitis, he has faced serious and 
ongoing medical complications.  The pain and inconvenience arising from his illness are 
not lost on me; I feel deeply for him and extend my sympathy.  [to camera] I take my 
duty as a physician very seriously and I strive to give each patient the best possible care. 
 
[to camera] 
I have been a family physician for twenty years.  During this time I have seen countless 
patients and any number of ailments.  I became a doctor because I love medicine, love 
interacting with people, and truly want to help if I can.  This profession has been good to 
me and it pains me when I cannot help those seeking my help.  Sometimes this inability 
to help comes from my own limited resources at my clinic; sometimes medicine simply 
isn’t able to solve all problems.  [look away] Despite these limitations, however, I strive 
to give the best possible care to all of my patients.  It doesn’t matter to me what the 
patient’s complaint is or if I have known him for more than a minute; I want, and have an 
obligation, to help whomever I can and to do so to the best of my ability. 
 
[to camera] 
As I have said in my previous statement, when he came to see me, George Thompson’s 
symptoms were consistent with the stomach flu.  [look away] Rather than subject him to 
a number of, in my opinion, needless tests, I sent him home with instructions to stay 
rested and hydrated.  When he came back to see me a few days later, I did run some 
diagnostic tests, the results of which were inconclusive.  [to camera] It is impossible for 
me to say how I would have continued treating George if he had returned another time, as 
each patient and course of treatment is unique. 
 
I know the jury has found me liable for misdiagnosing George’s appendicitis.  [look 
away] I can only explain, as I did at trial, that appendicitis can be a difficult diagnosis to 
make, even for a veteran physician.  That being said, I would, once again, like to offer my 
most profound apology to George for all of his pain and suffering. 
 
[to camera] 
Thank you. 
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Appendix D:  Defendant’s Statement (Excuse) 
 
Dr. Johnson’s Statement 
 
[to camera] 
Thank you for allowing me to make this statement. 
 
[look away] 
I take my duty as a physician very seriously and I strive to give each patient the best 
possible care. 
 
[to camera] [no pause between sentences] 
I have been a family physician for twenty years.  During this time I have seen countless 
patients and any number of ailments.  I became a doctor because I love medicine, 
interacting with people, and truly want to help if I can.  This profession has been good to 
me and it pains me when I cannot help those seeking my help.  Sometimes this inability 
to help comes from my own limited resources at my clinic; sometimes medicine simply 
isn’t able to solve all problems.  [look away] Despite these limitations, however, I strive 
to give the best possible care to all of my patients.  It doesn’t matter to me what the 
patient’s complaint is or if I have known him for more than a minute; I want, and have an 
obligation, to help whomever I can and to do so to the best of my ability. 
 
[to camera] 
As I have said in my previous statement, when he came to see me, George Thompson’s 
symptoms were consistent with the stomach flu.  [look away] Rather than subject him to 
a number of, in my opinion, needless tests, I sent him home with instructions to stay 
rested and hydrated.  When he came back to see me a few days later, I did run some 
diagnostic tests, the results of which were inconclusive.  [to camera] It is impossible for 
me to say how I would have continued treating George if he had returned another time, as 
each patient and course of treatment is unique. 
 
I know the jury has found me liable for misdiagnosing George’s appendicitis.  [look 
away] I can only offer, as I did at trial, that appendicitis can be a difficult diagnosis to 
make, even for a veteran physician. 
 
[to camera] 
Thank you. 
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Appendix E:  Compensatory Damages 
 
You have read the facts of the case, including statements from the defendant.  It is 
now your job to determine how much (if any) damages to award the plaintiff in 
compensatory damages.  Compensatory damages exist to compensate the plaintiff 
for the loss he has suffered. 
 
    If, under the court's instructions, you find that the plaintiff [George Thompson] is 
entitled to a verdict against defendant [Dr. Johnson], you must then award George 
Thompson damages (economic and non-economic) in an amount that will reasonably 
compensate for each of the following elements of claimed injury, damage, loss, or harm. 
    The term economic damages means objectively verifiable monetary losses including 
medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
    The term non-economic damages means subjective, non-monetary losses including, 
but not limited to:  pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, and emotional 
distress. 
    The amount of such award including economic and non-economic damages shall 
include: 
 
 
$          
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Appendix F:  Questionnaire 
 
Please read the following questions and choose the number which most closely 
corresponds with your answer. 
 
1.  Based on the facts of the case, how responsible do you believe Dr. Johnson is 
misdiagnosing George Thompson’s appendicitis? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Responsible 
   Completely 
Responsible 
 
 
2.  Based on the facts of the case, how severe would you rate the overall physical injury 
to George Thompson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Severe 
   Extremely 
Severe 
 
3.  How sincere do you believe Dr. Johnson was when he made his statement? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Sincere 
   Completely 
Sincere 
 
3a.  In your opinion, what made Dr. Johnson’s statement seem sincere or insincere? 
 
 
4.  How believable was the statement offered by Dr. Johnson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Believable 
   Completely 
Believable 
 
4a.  In your opinion, what made Dr. Johnson’s statement (not) believable? 
 
 
5.  In your opinion, how satisfactory were Dr. Johnson’s statements in explaining the 
circumstances of the misdiagnosis? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Satisfactory 
   Completely 
Satisfactory 
 
6.  In your opinion, how adequately did Dr. Johnson’s statement address the situation at 
hand? 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All    Completely 
 
 
7.  In your opinion, how likely is it that Dr. Johnson will engage in similar behavior in the 
future? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Likely 
   Extremely 
Likely 
 
8.  How close would you rate the relationship between Dr. Johnson and George 
Thompson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Close 
   Very 
Close 
 
9.  How justified was George Thompson in bringing suit against Dr. Johnson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Justified 
   Very 
Justified 
 
10.  In your opinion, how guilty did Dr. Johnson feel for misdiagnosing George 
Thompson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Guilty 
   Extremely 
Guilty 
 
11.  In your opinion, how ashamed was Dr. Johnson that he misdiagnosed George 
Thompson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Ashamed 
   Extremely 
Ashamed 
 
12.  In your opinion, how compassionate is Dr. Johnson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Compassionate 
   Extremely 
Compassionate 
 
13.  In your opinion, how difficult was it for Dr. Johnson to make his statement? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
Difficult 
   Extremely 
Difficult 
 
 
14.  To what extent do you empathize (identify) with Dr. Johnson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Not at All 
 
   Completely 
 
15.  To what extent do you empathize (identify) with George Thompson? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at All 
 
   Extremely 
 
 
16.  Do you agree with the jury’s verdict that Dr. Johnson is liable? 
     
Yes 
 
   No 
 
 
 
17.  Had George Thompson ever visited Dr. Johnson before the visit which resulted in the 
lawsuit? 
     
Yes 
 
   No 
 
 
18.  Did Dr. Johnson say “I’m sorry” at any point when he was making his statement? 
     
Yes 
 
   No 
 
19.  Regardless whether Dr. Johnson used the word ‘sorry,’ did his statement make you 
think that Dr. Johnson was sincerely sorry? 
     
Yes 
 
   No 
 
20.  What do you think was Dr. Johnson’s primary motivation for offering his statement? 
He was truly 
sorry. 
He was trying 
to present 
himself in the 
best possible 
light. 
His attorney 
told him to 
make the 
statement. 
Other (please 
explain): 
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Appendix G:  Interpersonal Trust Scale5 
 
Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by using the 
following scale: 
1 = Strongly Agree 
2 = Mildly Agree 
3= Agree and Disagree Equally (or neither agree nor disagree) 
4 = Mildly Disagree 
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. 
 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until the strangers have provided 
evidence that they are trustworthy. 
 
This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into politics. 
 
Fear of social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience prevents most people from 
breaking the law. 
 
Using the honor system of not have a teacher present during exams would probably result 
in increased cheating. 
 
Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises. 
 
The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world peace. 
 
The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment. 
 
Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that the public hears and 
sees is distorted. 
 
It is safe to believe that, in spite of what people say, most people are primarily interested 
in their own welfare. 
 
Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and T.V., it is hard to get objective 
accounts of public events. 
 
The future seems very promising. 
 
If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public would have 
reason to be more frightened than they now seem to be. 
 
Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign promises. 
 
                                                 
5
 Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967, 1971) 
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Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or another. 
 
Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge. 
 
Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats of punishments. 
 
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
 
In these competitive times you have to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of 
you. 
 
Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach. 
 
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
 
Most students in school would not cheat even if they were sure of getting away with it. 
 
Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant of their specialty. 
 
A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony. 
 
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
 
 
  
122 
 
Appendix H:  Faith in People Scale6 
 
Select the option which most closely fits with your answer of the question. 
 
1. Some people say that most people can be trusted.  Others say you can’t be too careful 
in your dealings with people.  How do you feel about it? 
 
Most people can be trusted. You can’t be too careful. 
 
 
2. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to 
look out for themselves? 
 
To help others. To look out for themselves. 
 
 
3. If you don’t watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. 
 
Agree Disagree 
 
 
4. 
 
No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. 
 
Agree Disagree 
 
 
5. 
 
Human nature is fundamentally cooperative. 
Agree Disagree 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Faith in People Scale (Rosenberg, 1957) 
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Appendix I:  International Personality Item Pool 
 
Please read each statement carefully and then use the scale below to rate how 
accurately each statement describes you.  Rate yourself as you generally are now, 
not as you wish to be in the future.  Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in 
relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same 
age.  So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be 
kept in absolute confidence. 
 
1 = Very Inaccurate 
2 = Moderately Inaccurate 
3 = Neither Inaccurate or Accurate (or equally accurate and inaccurate) 
4 = Moderately Accurate 
5 = Very Accurate 
 
I trust others. 
I believe that others have good intentions. 
I trust what people say. 
I believe that people are basically moral. 
I believe in human goodness. 
I distrust people. 
I suspect hidden motives in others. 
I believe most people try to be fair. 
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Appendix J:  Demographic Information 
 
Age:      
Gender:  Male 
               Female 
 
Year in School:  Freshman 
                           Sophomore 
                           Junior 
                           Senior 
                           Other 
 
Religious Affiliation:   
Christian (Non-Denominational) 
Catholic 
                                    Protestant 
    Lutheran 
    Methodist 
    Presbyterian 
    Baptist 
    Other Protestant 
   Mormon 
                                    Jewish 
                                    Muslim 
                                    Other (Please Specify) 
 
How strongly do you identify with your religion? 
 
Major: 
 
Do you have a regular physician? 
 
Do you have health insurance? 
 
Have you ever been involved in medical malpractice litigation? 
 
How many times a year do you see a physician? 
 
Is Dr. Johnson liable for George Thompson’s injuries? 
 
Please indicate the level of your parents’ educations on the scale immediately below. 
 
Mother  Father 
 some high school/vocational 
school 
 
 high school/vocational  
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school graduate/GED 
 some college/associate’s 
degree 
 
 college graduate (bachelor’s 
degree) 
 
 some graduate/professional 
school 
 
 graduate/professional degree  
 
 
 
